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SOLVING THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES OF PRIVATE CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS: PROMOTING FLEXIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE AND
ENGAGING THE PUBLIC LAND USE PROCESS
Gerald Korngold*
Over the past thirty years, statutes have reversed the common law and
authorized private conservation organizations to hold conservation easements in
gross. These interests allow nonprofits to control the use and development of the
burdened property by preventing alterations of the natural and ecological features.
Conservation easements can be held by organizations geographically distant from
the restricted land.
Conservation easements bring great benefits as they support conservation,
represent private initiative, yield efficiency benefits, and exemplify freedom of
choice of property owners. But there are also costs: significant federal and state
tax subsidies, the lack of coordinated planning and public process, class issues,
stewardship failures by nonprofits, and lack of flexibility by easement holders to
meet emerging needs of the community (such as for economic development or
affordable housing). Further, there is a risk to effective policy making and
democratic principles when local public land use decisions are delegated to
nonrepresentative, nonaccountable private organizations.
The benefits of private conservation easements are significant, and they
should be continued but with changes. This Article suggests five principles and
related specific reforms that should be enacted: restoring market mechanisms in
the creation of conservation easements, enhancing governance and operations of
easement holders, protecting the expectations of future generation owners,
achieving flexibility through expanded termination and modification doctrines, and
preserving the public's power of eminent domain.
* © 2008 by Gerald Korngold, Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve University of Law and Visiting Fellow, Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The author appreciates comments from participants at
faculty workshops at New York Law School, Brooklyn Law School, and Villanova
University School of Law, as well as detailed comments from Jonathan Adler. All errors




1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1039
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS .......... 1044
A. Defining Conservation Easements ...................................................... 1044
B. The Growth in Conservation Easements ............................................. 1046
C. The Tax Subsidy .................................................................................. 1049
D. Perpetuity and In Gross Ownership .................................................... 1050
1. Perpetuity .................................................................................... 1051
2. In Gross Ownership .................................................................... 1051
3. Covenants, Easements, and Property Theory ............................. 1052
III. THE POLICY MATRIX: THE ADVANTAGES AND CONCERNS WITH
PRIVATE CONSERVATION EASEMENTS ....................................................... 1054
A. Advantages of Conservation Easements ............................................. 1054
1. The Conservation Value .............................................................. 1054
2. Private Action .............................................................................. 1055
3. Efficiency Benefits ....................................................................... 1056
4. Freedom of Choice ...................................................................... 1056
B. Concerns About Conservation Easements .......................................... 1057
1. Creation ....................................................................................... 1057
2. Ongoing ....................................................................................... 1062
IV. FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR IMPROVING THE LAW OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS ................................................................................................. 1065
A. Principle I.- Restore Market Mechanisms in the Creation of
Conservation Easements ..................................................................... 1066
1. Federal Tax D eductions .............................................................. 1066
2. Unclogging the M arket ................................................................ 1070
B. Principle II: Enhance Easement Holder Governance and
Operations ........................................................................................... 1070
1. Stewardship and Enforcement ..................................................... 1070
2. Ability to Compromise ................................................................. 1072
C. Principle III. Protect Expectations of Future Generation Owners ..... 1073
D. Principle IV.- Achieving Flexibility Through Expanded Modification
and Termination Doctrines ................................................................. 1076
1. Changed Conditions .................................................................... 1077
2. Cy Pres ....................................................................................... 1078
3. Doctrine of Relative Hardship .................................................... 1078
4. Covenants Violating Public Policy ............................................. 1080
5. Termination and the IRC ............................................................. 1080
E. Principle V." Preserving the Public's Power of Eminent Domain ....... 1081
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 1084
[No. 41040
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: PROMOTING FLEXIBILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Book Twelve of Homer's Odyssey' tells how Odysseus avoided the lure of the
Sirens' singing from the nearby shore that had enticed many other sailors to
shipwreck and death. On the counsel of Circe, Odysseus plugged the ears of his
sailors with wax so they could ignore the voices, stay by their oars and propel their
ship past the Sirens' promontory. Odysseus ordered his men to tie him tightly to
the mast. So bound, Odysseus would be able to hear the beautiful words and
voices, but the inflexible restraints would prevent him from leaping to his death.
And so the ship proceeded, with his men adding further bonds when Odysseus
indicated his desire to break free, until it passed beyond the reach of the Sirens'
call. The unyielding ties on Odysseus protected him from his own curiosity, if not
folly, in the face of a deadly peril.2
Standing alone, the narrative of Odysseus and the Sirens could be read as
advocating for the placing of inflexible restraints on people and preventing them
from altering course. But the lens should be zoomed out and the story should
instead be seen in the context of the entire Odyssey, a life journey both physical
and spiritual.3 In that broader voyage, Odysseus was not tied to the mast but stood
on deck piloting his ship as master of his vessel.4 Thus, his binding to the mast
should be understood as a unique and extreme measure, necessary because of
extraordinary danger. The lashing to the mast is not representative, nor
prescriptive, for how Odysseus met the many other demands on his trip. Binding
restraints have their role at times, but flexibility opens the way to myriad
opportunities and benefits.
This broader, contextual understanding of the narrative of the binding of
Odysseus to the mast provides a helpful lesson for the law of property and
perpetual real property arrangements. Binding arrangements can certainly be
beneficial at times, providing certainty and clarity. But because human needs and
desires, technology, and the condition and ecology of land all shift over time,
parties to consensual arrangements and the law have usually opted for agreements
and doctrines that permit the flexibility necessary to respond to inevitable change.
Facing certain danger, Odysseus temporarily bound himself, but on an uncertain
1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 170-83 (Edward McCrorie Trans., Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 2004).
2 For interpretations of the Sirens story, see Gerald K. Gresseth, The Homeric Sirens,
101 TRANSACTIONS & PROC. OF THE AM. PHILOLOGICAL Ass'N 203, 203-18 (1970), and
Albrecht Wellmer, The Death of the Sirens and the Origin of the Work of Art, 81 NEW
GERMAN CRITIQUE 5, 5-19 (2000).
3 On the meaning of The Odyssey, see R.B. Rutherford, The Philosophy of the
Odyssey, 106 J. OF HELLENIC STUD. 145, 145-62 (1986), and Michael J. Shapiro,
Politicizing Ulysses: Rationalistic, Critical, and Genealogical Commentaries, 17 POL.
THEORY 9, 9-32 (1989).
4 While he did not have free will as we today would understand it, he had freedom of
choice to the extent permitted by the fates and ancient gods of the text.
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voyage he needed freedom and flexibility to respond to the endless and unknown
obstacles he encountered.
Private conservation easements embody a similar tension between restraints
and flexibility. Over the past three decades, nonprofit organizations and trusts have
been granted the authority to hold conservation easements. A conservation
easement empowers the nonprofit to perpetually prevent the owner of the property
subject to the easement from altering the property's scenic and ecological status
quo. Such conservation easements are referred to as being "private" or "privately
held," in contrast to being owned by a governmental body.5 Moreover, the
nonprofit may hold the conservation easement "in gross"-meaning that the
nonprofit is not required to own neighboring land benefited by the easement, and it
can enforce its ownership interest from outside of the community in which the
burdened property is located.6
Conservation easements held by private nonprofit organizations serve
important interests of this generation and those to come by preserving ecologically
valuable property. By preventing the often irreversible destruction of natural
features, landscapes, habitat, and open space, conservation easements serve a vital
public need. The current legal regime and incentive system of conservation
easements, however, simultaneously create a serious risk of binding future
generations with outmoded and rigid restrictions on land. Inevitable changes in the
human condition, society, technology, and ecology may require the shift of land
use patterns in the future. Future generations will likely be required to make
5 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 19 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1994) (conservation
easements placed on property by federal Farmer's Home Administration); Sabine River
Auth. v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 388, 391 (E.D. Tex. 1990), aft'd, 951 F.2d 669 (5th
Cir. 1992) (federal Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service acquisition of
conservation easements); Mira Mar Mobile Cmty. v. City of Oceanside, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d
308, 318-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (conservation easements used by city as part of
environmental impact mitigation of proposed building project); Conservation Law Found.,
Inc. v. Town of Lincolnville, 2001 ME 175, 10, 786 A.2d 616, 619-20 (town practice of
conditioning subdivision plan on developer granting conservation easement was
permitted); Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Dev. v. Mullen, 886 A.2d 900, 903 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2005) (conservation easement on historical property granted to division of state
department); Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v. Knowlton, 476 N.E.2d 988, 989 (N.Y. 1985)
(enforcing conservation easements purchased by Palisades Interstate Park Commission in
1977); see also Frederick W. Cubbage & David H. Newman, Forest Policy Reformed: A
United States perspective, 9 FOREST POL'Y & ECON. 261, 270-71 (2006) (describing
ongoing use of conservation easements by federal forest programs); Brian W. Ohm, The
Purchase of Scenic Easements and Wisconsin's Great River Road.: A Progress Report on
Perpetuity, 66 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 177, 178 (2000) (reporting on government program that
began in the 1960s).
6 Conservation easements may not be held by private parties or for-profit entities
unless they own a neighboring property benefited by the easement. See UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2) & cmt., 12 U.L.A. 170-79 (1996) (limiting
ownership to charitable and governmental entities); id. § 4, 12 U.L.A. 179-80 (not
requiring the easement to be "appurtenant," or attached to a benefited parcel).
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choices that we cannot now imagine. As to the ones that we can contemplate, such
as the tradeoff between conservation and economic development or affordable
housing, we cannot and should not determine the balance that future generations
should strike in light of their needs and conditions. There is a risk, therefore, of the
current generation creating a network of conservation easements that no longer
serves environmental purposes and at the same time frustrates future generations
from using the land to meet their pressing needs. This danger is exacerbated
because control over important public land issues has been delegated to
nonrepresentative, nonaccountable private organizations.
These threats can be mitigated, however, and the value of private conservation
enhanced, if legislators and courts follow five principles to implement needed
reforms. These principles include: first, restoring market mechanisms in the
creation of conservation easements; second, enhancing easement holder
governance and operations; third, protecting the expectation of future generation
owners; fourth, achieving flexibility through expanded modification and
termination doctrines; and fifth, preserving the public's power of eminent domain.
By taking these steps, we can give future generations the benefits of conservation,
but at the same time allow them to find their own better paths when they require
flexible solutions.
Part II shows the dramatic growth in private conservation easements over the
past thirty years, stemming from the adoption of authorizing legislation that
reversed common law impediments. It examines the federal and state tax subsidies
that underlie many conservation easements. It also highlights key features of
private conservation easements-perpetuity and in gross ownership-that
represent a break from prior legal rules and traditional concerns about restrictions
on land. Part III examines the advantages and concerns with private conservation
easements. It analyzes the value of conservation of natural environment, the
benefit of private rather than governmental action, the efficiency of private
easement arrangements, and the freedom of choice of property owners. It also
identifies and evaluates the disadvantages of conservation easements. First, the
cost of tax subsidies is significant and growing, and Congress has not produced
meaningful reform legislation. Moreover, there is a lack of public planning and
process in private organizations' decisions on conservation easements, which
affect local land use. This loss of democratic local land use control is exacerbated
by in gross ownership, allowing distant organizations to hold conservation
easements and by potential or real class conflicts. Additionally, there are concerns
about consistent stewardship of easements and whether nonprofits can and will be
flexible in their enforcement when the public interest requires modification and
perhaps termination.
Despite these questions about the current structure of conservation easements,
Part IV argues for the continuation of private conservation easements. It also,
however, proposes important modifications of legal rules in accordance with the
five principles described above. First, to enhance market operations, the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) should be amended to permit a deduction only if federal,
state, or local government has approved the particular conservation easement. The
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states should also require local recorders to maintain clearer records of
conservation easements so that policymakers and market players can better identify
and account for them. Second, state attorneys general should play a greater role in
the enforcement of conservation easements and ensure that good governance
practices are maintained by nonprofits holding such interests. Moreover, state law
must be clarified to allow nonprofit boards flexibility to deal with conservation
easements without fear of breaching their fiduciary duty. Third, courts should
follow doctrines of strict construction when interpreting conservation easements so
that future owners of the burdened property are not restricted without fair notice.
Fourth, the courts should deny injunctive enforcement of, or even terminate,
conservation easements when enforcement would violate public policy. Finally,
the legislatures and courts should reaffirm eminent domain power to terminate
conservation easements for economic development purposes, in light of the post-
Kelo narrowing of this power by state courts and legislatures.
These steps will preserve the benefits of private conservation easements while
minimizing their negative effects on current and future citizens. This will make
conservation easements a true gift to those that follow us.
II. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A. Defining Conservation Easements
The term "conservation easement" first received notice in the late 1950s, and
has grown in recognition over the years.7 Conservation easements are negative
7 William H. Whyte, Jr. popularized if not coined the phrase, and was an early
proponent. William H. Whyte, Jr., Securing Open Space for Urban America: Conservation
Easements, URBAN LAND INST.: TECHNICAL BULL., Dec. 1959, at 36. Early influential legal
writers and supporters of conservation easements included RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN,
PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND (Conservation and Research
Foundation 1967) and Roger A. Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway
Beautification Program, 45 DENV. L.J. 168 (1968). For a history of the land trust
movement and its work on conservation easements, see Richard Brewer, CONSERVANCY:
THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (Univ. Press of New England 2003). For prior
work on conservation easements, see Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation
Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63
TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984). Other articles on conservation easements include James Boyd,
Kathryn Caballero & R. David Simpson, The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation:
Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2000);
Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENY. U. L. REV.
1077 (1996); John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land
Preservation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319 (1997); Jessica Owley Lippmann, The Emergence of
Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB. L. REv. 1043 (2006); Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
421 (2005); Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good:
Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (2001); Melissa
1044 [No. 4
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: PROMOTING FLEXIBILITY
restrictions that bar the owner of the burdened parcel from altering its ecological,
natural, open, or scenic features.8
Conservation easements employ provisions designed to preserve the subject
property in the current condition, without further development or degradation of
natural features. Some conservation easement documents provide an overall
statement of purpose to conserve the property's natural and scenic features and
then a catchall undertaking by the property owner not to take actions that would
violate this purpose.9 Easement documents typically include specific clauses, such
as those that limit or prohibit additional building on the premises, timber cutting or
tree removal, subdivision of the parcel, grants of rights-of-way easements,
construction of roads and driveways, storage of trash, the use of all-terrain
vehicles, or disturbance of the surface. ° The easement may enumerate specific
actions related to the particular property that the owner may take consistent with
the easement, such as maintaining and replacing a deck and boat house or pruning
trees to maintain a scenic view, " building an additional residence, 12 or maintaining
and repairing the existing dwelling.' 3 Importantly, conservation easements
protecting natural habitat do not usually grant access to the public to the burdened
property,14 and easements protecting open space only grant "visual (rather than
K. Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the Enforcement and
Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation Tools.
Themes and Approaches to Date, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 373 (2001).
8 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170; see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. §47-42a(a) (2005). A related interest is a "historic faqade easement" that prevents
alterations or obstructions in the facades of buildings, or requires preapproval for such
actions. See, e.g., Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110,
1113-14 (D.C. App. 1994) (upholding summary judgment against property owner who
modified his home in violation of easement).
9 See, e.g., Glass v. Comm'r, 471 F.3d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Rattee v.
Comm'r, 761 A.2d 1076, 1078 (N.H. 2000) (barring activities that "result in rendering the
site no longer suitable for agricultural use"); Boyd, Caballero & Simpson, supra note 7, at
222 tbl. 1.
'0 See, e.g., Glass, 471 F.3d at 703 (barring subdivision and new buildings);
McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 104 (1991) (permitting subdivision and
construction of four new homes), aff'd, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Goldmuntz v. Town
of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (barring billboards, signs,
dumping of soil, removal of minerals or soil, activities detrimental to drainage). For a
description of various possible restrictions, see ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN B. WRIGHT,
SAVING THE RANCH: CONSERVATION EASEMENT DESIGN IN THE AMERICAN WEST 61-67
(2004).
" See, e.g., Glass, 471 F.3d at 704.
12 See, e.g., Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich, 757 A.2d 1263, 1264 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2000).
13 See, e.g., Goldmuntz, 651 N.E.2d at 867.
14 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(3)(iii) (2007) (not requiring public access);
Brenneman, supra note 7, at 100.
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physical) access" to a portion of the property. 15 Thus, except for conservation
easements creating recreational rights, public access is usually not granted.
16
Conservation easements may, however, allow access for occasional inspections by
the easement holder.17
B. The Growth in Conservation Easements
There is limited data on the number and acreage of conservation easements
that currently exist. The vast majority of states do not require a special index or set
of recording books for conservation easements.1 8 During a title search of a specific
parcel the searcher should find a conservation easement properly recorded against
it, but there is no centralized list of all conservation easements within the
jurisdiction. 19 Thus, it is difficult to see the full scope, pattern, and number of
conservation easements within an area or state. Some reports indicate that even
land trusts holding conservation easements were unclear as to the easements that
they owned.20 Lack of information makes it difficult for policymakers and
"5 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(B). It is claimed that "[t]he public receives the
benefit of keeping land in open space for scenic vistas and in working land uses." The
Nature Conservancy, Conservation Easements: Facts vs. Fiction, http://www.nature.org/about
us/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conservationeasements/about/myths.htm
(last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
16 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 66 ("The overwhelming majority of
easements grant no rights to the public to enter the property."); Boyd, Caballero &
Simpson, supra note 7, at 222 tbl. 1; ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE
CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 21 (2d ed. 2005) ("A conservation easement
requires public access only if the primary conservation value of the property is public
recreational or educational use."); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(2)(ii).
17 See, e.g., Glass v. Comm'r, 471 F.3d 698, 704 (6th Cir, 2006) (providing the donee
land trust with a right to enter the property for monitoring and scientific collection
purposes). A provision for entry to inspect is required for a federal tax deduction. See 26
C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(ii).
18 A few states have such requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Ponte, 246 F. Supp.
2d 74, 75 (D. Me. 2003) (referring to conservation easement books); CAL. GOVT. CODE §
27255(a) (West Supp. 2007) (mandating county recorders to maintain a comprehensive
index of all conservation easements created after 1/1/02); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §
49-0305(4) (McKinney 1997) (requiring that the easement must be recorded locally as
other real estate documents and copy sent to state department "which shall maintain a file
of conservation easements").
19 Massachusetts, with its statutory requirement of state and local governmental
approval for all conservation easements, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (LexisNexis
2007), has been able to compile a list of conservation easements. See JEFF PIDOT,
REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND IDEAS FOR
REFORM 12 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2005).
20 See PIDOT, supra note 19, at 12 (citing report of Bay Area Open Space Council that
one-third of surveyed land trusts lacked list of easements); STAFF OF S. FINANCE COMM.,
108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, pt. 2, 2 (2005), available at
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potential market players to get a comprehensive view of conservation easements,
which essentially establish a land use regulation scheme, within an area.
Still, there are some numbers indicating the significant growth of privately
held conservation easements in America. 2' According to a 2005 Land Trust
Alliance report, local and state land trusts in the United States held easements on
over 6.2 million acres, showing a 148% increase from the 2000 figure of 2.5
million.2 The Nature Conservancy reported in 2007 that it holds over 3.2 million
acres of land under conservation easements, in addition to the land held by local
and regional land trusts.2 3 The Land Trust Alliance and The Nature Conservancy
combined figures yield over 9 million acres under conservation easements, and this
does not include conservation easements held by other types of nonprofit
organizations or land trusts not included in the Land Trust Alliance report.24 Nine
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/sitepages/TNC%20Report.htm (follow "Part Two"
hyperlink) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY].
Different sources offer widely different totals. For example, the Nature Conservancy
reports that in New York there are 685,000 acres under conservation easements held by
local and regional land trusts, while the Land Trust Alliance reports only 191,095 acres
held by local and state land trusts. Conservation Easements in New York, Mar. 2005,
http://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conservation
easements/files/cenewyork.pdf; LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST
CENSUS REPORT 20, chart 5, available at http://www.lta.org/census/2005_report.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 CENSUS REPORT].
21 Conservation easements have also spread to the international arena. See Charles E.
Di Leva, The Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources through Legal and Market-
Based Instruments, 11 RECIEL 84, 88 (2002); Anastasia Telesetsky, Graun Bilong Mipela
Na Mipela No Tromweim: The Viability of International Conservation Easements to
Protect Papua New Guinea's Declining Biodiversity, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 735,
737 (2001); Joshua P. Welsh, Comment, Firm Ground for Wetland Protection: Using the
Treaty Power to Strengthen Conservation Easements, 36 STETSON L. REv. 207, 239-46
(2006); Press Release, American Bird Conservancy, Spectacular Hummingbird Protected
by First Conservation Easement in Northern Peru (July 18, 2006), http://www.abcbirds.
org/media/releases/spatuletail-release.htrn.
22 2005 CENSUS REPORT, supra note 20, at 8. There are also numerous media reports
of specific conservation easements. See, e.g., Shannon McCaffrey, Ga. Rocker Donates
Conservation Easement, Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/2007-03-19-
1874986560_x.htm (300 acre tract donation by Rolling Stones keyboardist Chuck Leavell);
Billingsgazette.com, Rocky Mountain Front Range Under Conservation Easement, Feb. 6,
2007, http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2007/02/06/news/state/44-front.txt, (4300 acre
ranch conservation easement purchased by the Nature Conservancy).
23 Conservation Easements in New York, supra note 20 (stating 3.2 million acres held
by The Nature Conservancy and 5.1 million acres as of 2003 by local and regional land
trusts). For a discussion of the growth of conservation easements in the period of 1988-
1998, see Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary
Action, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 9, 9-25 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds. 2000).
24 See, e.g., News Release, Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Office of Public Affairs,
University of Texas at Austin Signs Conservation Easement for Fennessey Ranch (Aug. 11,
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million acres is an area equivalent to the aggregate size of Rhode Island, Delaware,
Connecticut, and Hawaii.2 5 Moreover, the data show that conservation easements
are becoming the conservation tool of choice. From 2000 to 2005, land trusts
increased their fee holdings by only 40% compared to 148% for conservation
easements.26
Common law rules in most jurisdictions either barred privately held
conservation easements or placed their legality into serious doubt.27 Legislative
validation within the states was necessary to reverse common law prohibitions and
give donors and organizations confidence to create these interests. The drive for
such statutes during the 1970s led to the promulgation of the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act in 1981,28 subsequently adopted by twenty
jurisdictions. 29 The Act's key operative provision equates conservation easements
to traditional easements for the purpose of creation, conveyance, recording,
assignment, release, modification, and termination. 30 Common law objections to
conservation easements are specifically rejected.31 Other states adopted statutes
with similar effect to the Uniform Act.32 Conservation easements are now
recognized as bona fide real property interests.33
2006), http://www.utexas.edu/opa/news/2006/08/msi I I.html (conservation easement held
by University of Texas on 3256 acre ranch).
25 Joan M. Youngman, Taxing and Untaxing Land.- Open Space and Conservation
Easements, STATE TAx NOTES, Sept. 11, 2006, at 747-62 n. 1.
26 2005 CENSUS REPORT, supra note 20, at 8.
27 See United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 446-48 (Va. 2005) (discussing
common law prohibition and statutory changes that permitted creation of both affirmative
and negative easements in gross, even prior to passage of Uniform Act); UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 4 & cmt., prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 164, 179 (1996)
(discussing common law hurdles to conservation easements). See infra Part II.D.2. on the
in gross issue.
28 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 163.
29 The jurisdictions and the effective dates are: Alabama (1997), Alaska (1989),
Arizona (1985), Delaware (1996), District of Columbia (1986), Georgia (1992), Idaho
(1988), Indiana (1984), Kansas (1992), Kentucky (1988), Maine (1985), Minnesota (1985),
Mississippi (1986), Nevada (1983), New Mexico (1991), Oklahoma (1999), South Carolina
(1991), Texas (1983), Virginia (1988), and Wisconsin (1981). See 12 U.L.A. 54 (Supp.
2006).
30 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 170, 173-77.
31 Id. § 4, 12 U.L.A. 179-80.
32 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-42a to -42c (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184,
§§ 31-33 (LexisNexis 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-102 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §
66-9-301 (2004).
33 See Fenster v. Hadi, No. 87 0090482 S, 1991 WL 257295, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 26, 1991) (conservation easement is a clog on marketable title.).
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C. The Tax Subsidy
The creation of conservation easements held by nonprofit organizations is
usually subsidized by the public purse through tax deductions on the federal and
state level.3 4 Under § 170(h) of the IRC, a taxpayer can deduct for federal tax
purposes the value of a "restriction"
35 "exclusively for conservation purposes"
36
that is donated to a "qualified" nonprofit organization.37 Providing the § 170(h)
requirements are met, a private conservation easement given to a nonprofit can
qualify for the deduction. Importantly, the deduction is only permitted if the
conservation restriction is "granted in perpetuity.',
38
Moreover, the presence of a conservation easement, created during the life of
the decedent or in her will, lowers the value of the subject property for federal
estate tax purposes. 39 The IRC also provides for postmortem donations of
conservation easements by the estate40 and an additional exclusion from estate tax
for certain conservation easements. 41 These provisions mean additional revenue
losses for the Treasury due to conservation easements.
Local and state tax revenues are also reduced by the presence of conservation
easements. Assessments for state and local property taxation are made based on the
land's market value,42 taking into account the restrictions on the title. Thus, where
a conservation easement eliminates the potential for development of the property,
the assessed value of the property and hence the tax revenues from the parcel are
decreased.43 The local municipality must then either cut services because of the
34 The Land Trust Alliance states that "[alnother major contributing factor to the surge
in private land conservation is the availability of state and federal tax incentives." 2005
CENSUS REPORT, supra note 20, at 8.
" I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006).
36 Id. § 170(h)(1)(C).
17 Id. § 170(h)(1)(B). For a discussion of § 170(h), see C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income
Tax Aspects of Conservation Easements, 5 Wyo. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2005); Nancy A.
McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations"A
Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (2004) (providing a critical analysis of the tax
incentives designed to encourage conservation easement donations and proposals to
increase those incentives); Stephen Small, Real Estate Developers and Conservation
Easements, 19 PROB. & PROP. May/June 2005, at 24 (discussing the use of § 170(h) by real
estate developers and the consequences of its implementation).
38 I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C).
'9 26 C.F.R. § 25.2703-1(a)(4) (2007).
40 I.R.C. § 2055(f).
41 Id. § 2031 (c) (permitting the exclusion from the estate of an additional forty percent
of the land's restricted value, up to $500,000).
42 See Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Colo. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146, 151 (Colo.
1988) (including reasonable future use of the property); JOAN YOUNGMAN, LEGAL ISSUES
IN PROPERTY VALUATION AND TAXATION 55-92 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2006).
43 See Jet Black, LLC v. Rout County Bd. of County. Comm'rs, 165 P.3d 744, 750-51
(Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (referring to special statutory treatment of conservation easement
land under agricultural use); Firethorn Inv. v. Lancaster County Bd. of Equalization, 622
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decreased revenue or increase the tax burden on other citizens to make up for the
gap.4
States also subsidize the donation of conservation easements through
deductions on state income taxes.4 5 An increasing number of states go farther and
provide for an income tax credit, rather than a simple deduction.46 Colorado, for
example, gives an income tax credit of fifty percent of the easement's value up to a
maximum of $375,000. 47 Moreover, taxpayers unable to use these credits may sell
them to others at approximately eighty to eighty-five percent of face value, or if
there is a budget surplus, cash in their credits for a refund from the state.48 These
state subsidies provide additional incentives to federal income tax and local
property tax benefits.
D. Perpetuity and In Gross Ownership
The modem private conservation easement lasts in perpetuity and may be
owned by a party who does not own any property adjacent to the land where the
N.W.2d 605, 610-12 (Neb. 2001) (stating that when land's highest and best use was as a
golf course, presence of conservation easements did not reduce its value); Gibson v.
Gleason, 798 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (N.Y. 2005) (upholding trial court's order to reduce
property tax assessment because of conservation easement barring subdivision and limiting
lot to agricultural uses); Ross v. Town of Santa Clara, 698 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92-93 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) (holding that since land was already restricted against development,
conservation easement did not decrease value); McKee v. Dep't of Revenue, No. TC-4620,
2004 WL 2340265, at *3 (Or. T.C. Oct. 14, 2004) (finding significant effect of
conservation easement on value when compared to other properties); Luca v. Lincoln
County Assessor, Nos. TC-MD 010953F, TC-MD 010931D, TC-MC 020326C, TC-MD
020484D, 2003 WL 21252488, at *8 (Or. T.C. Mar. 19, 2003) (acknowledging drop in
development potential); Daniel S. Stockford, Comment, Property Tax Assessment of
Conservation Easements, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 823 (1990). For an excellent
discussion of the various jurisdictional treatments of conservation easements for state tax
purposes, see Youngman, supra note 25.
44 See Christopher M. Anderson & Jonathan R. King, Equilibrium Behavior in the
Conservation Easement Game, 80 LAND ECON. 355, 358 (2004); Jonathan R. King &
Christopher M. Anderson, Marginal Property Tax Effects of Conservation Easements: A
Vermont Case Study, 86 AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 919, 919-20 (2004).
45 This is usually reflected not by a specific state tax code provision but by the state
tracking the federal income tax structure and its deductions. See Jeffrey 0. Sundberg &
Richard F. Dye, Tax and Property Value Effects of Conservation Easements 7 & nn. 15-16
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP06JS1, 2006), available at
http://lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?pubid= 1128; Vermont Land Trust, Conservation
Easement Donations, http://www.vlt.org/ConservationEasementDonations.pdf.
46 See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(38) (McKinney Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-151.12 (Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512 (Supp. 2007); see also Janie E.
Bowen, Virginia Tax Commissioner Issues Guidelines on Land Preservation Tax Credit,
53 ST. TAX NOTES 17 (2007).
47 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-522 (2006).
48 Mountains for the Centuries, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2007, at 35.
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easement is located-also known as in gross ownership. These features, however,
run counter to traditional legal rules, attitudes, and policy considerations. Despite
legislation that has overruled common law misgivings on these attributes, the
policy considerations remain and require accommodation.
1. Perpetuity
Privately held conservation easements are typically created for an unlimited
duration. While theoretically the duration should be a matter of active negotiation,
various factors in combination are yielding a pattern of perpetual conservation
easements. First, the Uniform Act reflects the dominant legislative scheme of
defaulting to perpetuity by providing that "a conservation easement is unlimited in
duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides. ' '49 Moreover, a
conservation easement is deductible under the IRC only if it is "granted in
perpetuity." 50 That provision is a huge motivation for creating interests with an
unlimited life. Finally, conservation organizations typically provide for an
unlimited duration in their model documents.51
2. In Gross Ownership
An easement or a covenant is held in gross when its owner does not have
neighboring land that is benefited by the interest on the burdened property. 2 The
Uniform Act, like other legislation authorizing private conservation easements,
specifically permits nonprofits to hold these interests in gross. 3 Thus, through the
ownership of easements, an out-of-state nonprofit can control local land use
decisions, even though it owns no other land in the area. Because easements can be
held in gross, nonprofits have no geographical limits to their easement acquisition
programs nor physical limitations on areas in which they can be involved.
" UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 173 (1996). North Dakota
is an exception, providing for a ninety-nine year duration. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02.1
(1999).
'0 I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006). The Tax Act of 1976, which first created
conservation easement donation deductions, originally provided for deductibility of an
easement with a thirty-year duration, but that was subsequently changed to the perpetual
requirement. Youngman, supra note 25, at 749.
51 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 153; The Nature Conservancy,
Conservation Easements: Facts vs. Fiction, http://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/
conservationmethods/privatelands/conservationeasements/about/myths.html (last visited
Dec. 30, 2007); see also United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 444 (2005) (deed
providing "in perpetuity").
52 GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL
COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 10-15 (2d ed. 2004). An easement or covenant
is appurtenant when the benefit is attached to land owned by the holder near the burdened
parcel. Id.
53 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 4(1), 12 U.L.A 179.
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3. Covenants, Easements, and Property Theory
The presumption of perpetuity and in gross ownership of conservation
easements raises serious public policy issues about flexibility and the control of
land use policy by nonlocal, private groups. Moreover, allowing unlimited duration
and in gross ownership runs counter to both legal theory and doctrinal rules that
were traditionally in place, and that had to be supplanted by legislation, to validate
private conservation easements.
(a) Conservation Easements, Covenants, or Servitudes?
Conservation easements are really not "easements" in the way that law has
understood such interests. Terming them "easements" is a misnomer. Traditionally,
easements were affirmative interests, giving the easement holder the right to do
something on the land of another, such as to cross another's land by a right-of-
way. 4 Except for a few rare and limited exceptions, the term "easement" was not
applied to negative interests that served to restrict the burdened property owner.55
Rather, negative interests were typically created as "covenants" and enforced as
"covenants running with the land at law" or "equitable servitudes. 56
Since conservation "easements" typically involve only negative restrictions
on the burdened owner's use of her property, they should more accurately be called
conservation "covenants., 57 Or, following the taxonomy of the Third Restatement
of Property (Servitudes), which unifies easements and covenants for many
purposes under the rubric "servitude," these interests could be called conservation
"servitudes. ' '5 8 Despite the inaccuracy, this Article uses the term "conservation
easement" as this has received common acceptance in the legal and popular
literature.
(b) Policy Against Restrictions
This is not merely a matter of semantics. Covenants, unlike easements, have
historically been viewed by the courts with suspicion, as reflected in their
theoretical musings and rules of law. Courts have often expressed an antipathy
towards covenants that create restrictions or restraints on land and state that they
54 See KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 1-4.
55 See id. at 7-10. Common law recognized only a few negative easements-light, air,
view, support, and stream flow. The Third Restatement of Property has abolished the
category of negative easement. Id.
56 Id. at 287-93.
57 See Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794, 797
(D.C. App. 1994) (specifically rejecting application of rules of affirmative easements to a
fagade easement, finding it more akin to a restrictive covenant); Southbury Land Trust, Inc.
v. Andricovich, 757 A.2d 1263, 1265 (2000) (applying law of restrictive covenants to a
conservation easement).
58 See Komgold, supra note 7.
1052 [No. 4
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: PROMOTING FLEXIBILITY
favor a policy of free and unrestricted use of land.59 This "antirestrictions policy"
has led the courts to declare a hard line against covenants, noting that they are "not
favorites of the law." 60 This antipathy led the law to erect various barriers to the
enforcement of covenants, reflected in various common law rules. Two such rules
would have made it difficult if not impossible to create private conservation
easements at common law. First, some courts attempted to narrow the duration
6 1
and operation of covenants 62 with constructional devices, raising (perhaps
surmountable) questions about the perpetual nature of conservation easements.
Second, the common law prohibition of enforcement of covenants in gross 63 would
have been fatal to the modem private conservation easement.
Although the courts do not typically explain the reasons for their concern
about restrictions created by covenants, the antirestrictions policy serves two
important, longstanding goals that resonate in the current conservation easement
discussion. First, stripping away restrictions that would hamper the functioning of
real estate markets helps to promote efficient use of our limited supply of land. The
rule against in gross ownership can be understood in this context.64 When a
covenant is held in gross, the covenant owner does not need to own a neighboring
fee interest to which the covenant attaches and so the covenant owner may be far
removed from the area.65 And as time passes, there may be multiple owners of the
in gross right through inheritance or sale, all living in parts unknown. This may
make it expensive or impossible for the fee owner to locate the covenant holder to
enter into negotiations about the covenant and to achieve modification or
termination. Transaction costs will be high. Moreover, there is no ongoing
neighborly exchange between the parties, which is often a lubricant in a give-and-
take bargaining process. Without the opportunity to negotiate, the market process
cannot work. The prohibition on in gross covenants can be understood as
preventing such market malfunction.
Second, the antirestrictions policy expresses a concern about permitting past
generations to control current property owners, where the old ties would frustrate
the personal autonomy of current owners.66 For example, covenants barring
occupancy by members of racial and religious groups were denied enforcement
59 See KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 358-62.
60 See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Conn. Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286, 289 (2d
Cir. 1984); Frander & Frander, Inc. v. Griffen, 457 So. 2d 375, 377 (Ala. 1984); Andrews
v. Lake Serene Prop. Owners Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 1328, 1331-32 (Miss. 1983).
61 KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 381-84.
62 See id. at 358-62.
63 See id. at 381-88.
64 See Gerald Korgold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property
Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U.
L. REv. 1525, 1549-51 (2007).
65 See KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 304, 378-79.
66 For example, direct restraints on alienation can force people to live where they no
longer want to remain and prevent them from moving to new areas. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 3.4, cmt. c (1998). See Komgold, supra note 64, at 1553-55.
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only in 1948,67 and covenants are still employed to control the nature of family
units living in a residential subdivision.68 When courts express general concerns
about duration of covenants, they may be reflecting some discomfort with
perpetually imposing the past's vision on the lives of the future. Even the
frustrating and rough Rule Against Perpetuities teaches the salutary lesson that at
some point the past must relinquish power and warns of the dangers of "dead
hand" control.69 Moreover, the prohibition on in gross ownership of covenants may
also reveal that while there is a willingness to tolerate ties between neighbors, a
higher level of suspicion attaches when outsiders try to assert control over a distant
area.
The choice of the term conservation "easement" by their proponents, despite
the inaccuracy under then existing and current legal conceptualizations, may have
served the goal of making these interests more accepted by legislators, courts, and
parties. In general, easements have long been accepted by the courts while
covenants have been viewed with some suspicion.y More specifically, there is no
doubt that easements can be created in fee, that is, perpetually, as well as in "in
gross." 71 Semantic sleight-of-hand and legislation removed constraints of the
common law rules on conservation easements, but the policy issues remain.
III. THE POLICY MATRIX: THE ADVANTAGES AND CONCERNS WITH PRIVATE
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A. Advantages of Conservation Easements
Privately held conservation easements bring significant advantages to current
and future citizens. These include conservation of our natural environment, private
action, efficiency, and freedom of choice. In combination, these benefits make a
powerful case for the continuation of private conservation easements, on both
policy and normative levels.
1. The Conservation Value
The conceptualization and legislative authorization of private conservation
easements reflects a fundamentally new outlook of Americans toward our nation's
67 See KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 399.
68 Gerald Korngold, Single Family Use Covenants: For Achieving a Balance Between
Traditional Family Life and Individual Autonomy, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 951, 951 (1989).
69 The rule is being repealed by many jurisdictions, for taxation and commercial
reasons, without adequate consideration of the social policy. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max
M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of
Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 430-33 (2005).70 See KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 2-3.
7' See id. at 10-15, 28-29.
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land.7z From the time of the first European settlers in North America, land had
been viewed exclusively as a commercial asset, to be fully exploited by its
owner.73 In contrast, over the past several decades, Americans have viewed
conservation of our natural and historical heritage as an important value to be
balanced against a traditional full-development model.74 Conservation easements
are an important tool to preserve ecological conditions and to protect this new
conservation value.
Moreover, development activities on unique environments are highly
expensive if not impossible to reverse. 75 This increases the stakes for effective,
strong preservation. For conservation proponents, the fixed, perpetual nature of
conservation easements is major plus.
76
2. Private Action
Conservation easements are private, not governmental, initiatives. Given the
excessive demands on government for top priority services and the limits of
government resources and energy, there are advantages when private citizens step
forward to take on roles to improve their communities. Costs of acquisition,
monitoring, stewardship, and enforcement of conservation easements are shifted
from local, state, and federal government to nonprofit organizations when the
holder is a nonprofit rather than a governmental entity.77 Furthermore, government
actors exercising decision making over conservation easements may be subject to
short term pressures and special interests, based on looming elections or the need
to derive additional tax revenues through development.78 These forces may not
make for the best long-term conservation easement policy and practice. In contrast,
72 See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization
of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 91-94 (2001).
73 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 169 (3d ed.
Touchstone 2005); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860, at 31 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977); Korngold, supra note 64, at 1533-35.
74 See BREWER, supra note 7, at 8-12; D.T. Kuzmiak, The American Environmental
Movement, 157 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 265, 265 (1991); Bob Pepperman Taylor, Environmental
Ethics and Political Theory, 23 POLITY 567, 577-78 (1991); Adam W. Rome, William
Whyte, Open Space, and Environmental Activism, 88 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 259, 261-62,
271 (1998).
75 See Alexander James, Kevin J. Gaston & Andrew Balmford, Can We Afford to
Conserve Biodiversity?, 51 BIOSCIENCE 43, 50-51 (2001).
76 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 31 (asserting that most land trusts only
accept perpetual easements). Certainly the IRC contemplates perpetuity. See supra Part
II.C.
77 See BYERS & PONTE, supra note 16, at 9-10; Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and
the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or Conservation Easements, 44 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 483, 503-04 (2004); Korngold, supra note 7, at 442-47.
78 See generally James M. Buchanan, Constraints on Political Action, in PUBLIC
FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE (James M. Buchanan & Richard A. Musgrave eds. 1999)
(discussing public choice theory and pressures on elected government officials).
2007] 1055
UTAH LAW REVIEW
nonprofits can hold these easements free of special-interest and short-term
pressures.
3. Efficiency Benefits
Permitting private conservation easements in gross also yields the market
efficiency advantages embodied in the notion of "freedom of contract." The law
generally allows a landowner to enter into market transactions with respect to her
property and to sell partial interests, such as a lease or a mortgage, in her land. The
law upholds these arrangements because free-market exchanges of land achieve an
efficient allocation of our limited (and nonrenewable) land resources.79
Private conservation easements are a good example of the efficiency benefits
of market transactions in fractional interests of real property. The fee owner retains
the rights that he wishes in the property (perhaps the right to live in a home or to
farm the land) and the nonprofit organization gets the control that they seek (the
ability to prevent further development). If the law barred the exchange of this
partial interest of the fee, the only way that the nonprofit could prevent
development would be to buy the property in fee simple absolute. This would be a
poor result as the nonprofit would have to pay a much higher amount, creating an
overinvestment in conservation. Also, the landowner would lose the option of
cashing out some of the land's value through sale or donation (with tax benefits) of
the easement while still living on the land, causing an overinvestment in living
space.80 This is not an efficient use of land resources.
4. Freedom of Choice
The notion that people are free to dispose of their property in the marketplace
is a key assumption of freedom of contract. Ownership of property entitles the
holder to seek her personal happiness and satisfaction by exercising her free choice
with respect to the property, whatever that choice may be and whatever other
people may think of the wisdom of that decision. The law should trump this
freedom of choice of property and impose on this right of property owners only in
rare circumstances and for overriding reasons. 81 Thus, if an owner wishes to donate
or sell a conservation easement to a nonprofit organization, she should be able to
do so.
7 9 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-10 (6th ed. 2003).
80 See Komgold, supra note 64, at 1543-45.
81 See Loeb v. Watkins, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa. 1968) ("Where a man's land is
concerned, he may impose.. any restrictions he pleases."); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
17 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1998); Richard Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in
the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1982); see also ANELLA & WRIGHT,
supra note 10, at 16 ("Conservation easements fully respect private property rights. In fact,
the tool is a powerful way of helping landowners do what they want with their land.").
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B. Concerns About Conservation Easements
Although there are compelling policy and normative reasons for permitting
private conservation easements, these interests come with costs that must be
addressed. Some problems can appear when the easement is created, and others
may emerge over time.
1. Creation
Permitting private organizations to hold conservation easements raises several
concerns at the time of the creation of the interests. These include the tax subsidy
to donors; the lack of standards, public participation, and process in the creation of
conservation easements; and class issues.
(a) Tax Subsidy
Very often conservation easements held by nonprofits are in reality not purely
private endeavors but rather are subsidized by the public purse through federal or
state tax deductions. It is therefore legitimate for the public to ask whether it is
getting full value in exchange for these subsidies.
In the 2003 tax year, federal income tax deductions for conservation and
historic easements totaled $1.49 billion.83 Assuming high bracket taxpayers, the
revenue loss to the Treasury could be roughly approximated in the $600 million
plus range. The presence of a tax benefit does not deny the charitable,
environmental motive of the donor84 nor the fact that despite the deduction the net
82 See discussion supra Part I.C. Tax benefits are described by at least some
nonprofits on their websites and are otherwise described in the literature. See, e.g., The
Nature Conservancy, Conservation Easements-All About Conservation Easements,
http ://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conservation
easements/about/allabout.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2007); see also Christopher E.
Williams & Meredith E. Lathbury, Economic Incentives for Habitat Conservation on
Private Land: Applications to the Inland Pacific Northwest, 24 WILDLIFE Soc'Y BULL.
187, 187-88 (1996) (discussing estate tax deferments); Rachel Emma Silverman, Tax
Break with a View: Landowners Rush to Take Advantage of New Law That Boosts
Deductions for Blocking Development, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at DI (noting that
increased tax breaks have translated into more easements).
83 Janette Wilson & Michael Strudler, Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions,
2003, SOI BULL., Spring 2006, at 58, 60, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/03inccart.pdf.
84 See BYERS & PONTE, supra note 16, at 15, 17; Loma Thackeray, Conservation
Easement Preserves Family's Way of Life, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2006/02/26/news/state/25-easement.txt (citing
continuity of family ranching as fundamental motivation for the subject of the article). But
see John B. Wright, Conservation Easements: An Analysis of Donated Development Rights,
59 J. AMER. PLANNING ASS'N 487, 488-89 (1993) (noting that tax savings is the most
common motivation for the donation).
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value of the property to the donor is reduced. In some cases the easement is
purchased by the nonprofit, albeit sometimes at a bargain price.85 It is clear,
though, that where a deduction is taken, the public purse subsidizes the transfer.
Abuses, especially through dubious appraisals and insider deals, have also cost the
Treasury. 86 Private conservation easements thus decrease federal revenues.
Moreover, conservation easements have an impact on state and local property
tax revenues. The unilateral decision of one homeowner to place a conservation
easement on her property can reduce state and local property tax revenues, forcing
government to cut services or to increase taxes on other citizens to maintain
services. 87 This could have a negative impact on the municipality's civic agenda
and on other residents.88 Experimental economics has shown that a donor's
decision to create conservation easements is based on her personal welfare
maximization and not on a consideration of the effects on others. 89 Thus,
conservation easements pose a cost to local governments and citizens.
State income tax conservation easement programs also create challenges. The
annual revenue loss to Colorado from its income tax credit program in 2005 was
85 See Murphy v. Long, 170 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. App. 2005) (regarding sale of lots
by the Nature Conservancy subject to conservation easement, with restriction presumably
reflected in the price); BYERS & PONTE, supra note 16, at 50, 250-251, 270-271
(describing acquisition techniques); Rocky Mountain Front Range Under Conservation
Easement, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://www.billingsgazette.net/
articles/2007/02/06/news/state/44-front.txt (describing conservation easement purchased by
the Nature Conservancy on 4300 acre ranch).
86 See Youngman, supra note 25, at 749-51. Abuses led to a congressional
investigation of the Nature Conservancy and legislation in 2006 to tighten appraisal
standards and penalties. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., REPORT ON
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (2005), available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/
sitepages/TNC%20Report.htm; see also Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
280, § 1219, 120 Stat. 1083, 1083-1086 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1219) ("Provisions
relating to substantial and gross overstatements of valuations."); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAX., 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, at 308-12 (2006). The Nature
Conservancy increased its oversight rules as a result. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, FINAL
REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT WORKING GROUP 2 (2004), available at http://
www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conservationease
ments/files/easements-report.pdf.
87 See discussion supra Part I.C.
88 Theoretically, a desirable and effective conservation easement on the donor's
property could enhance the value of neighboring properties, increasing the welfare of those
owners and the value of their properties. Tax revenues would thus not drop since the
increased assessments on the neighboring properties would yield increased revenues when
the tax rate is applied. But the effect on neighboring parcels' values is in actuality hard to
predict. Youngman, supra note 25, at 753; see also Jacqueline Geoghegan et al.,
Capitalization of Open Spaces into Housing Values and the Residential Property Tax
Revenue Impacts of Agricultural Easement Programs, 32 AGRIC. & RES. ECON. REV. 33,
34 (2003).
89 See Anderson & King, supra note 44, at 357, 360.
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$85.1 million, up from $2.3 million in 2001.90 The cost and conservation efficacy
of this program has led to attempts to amend it.91 Colorado's program may indeed
be consistent with the strong environmental preference of its citizenry and may
support its substantial outdoor recreation industry. It is unclear, however, whether
the public is getting the maximum benefit for its tax subsidy dollars from a
patchwork of private conservation easements that were created without an overall
environmental planning process.
(b) Standards, Public Planning, and Process
Private groups have virtually unlimited discretion in purchasing or accepting
donations of easements and do not have to follow standards or a plan in making
such determinations. 92 The nonprofit may simply accept any easement that comes
its way, even though the land to be conserved and the terms of the easement are of
dubious environmental benefit. Best practices on easement selection and terms
may help to address these issues, but they are not a true solution in any case since
they would not be mandatory.9 3
Moreover, private organizations do not accumulate conservation easements
pursuant to a public land use plan. This can easily result in a patchwork of
easements that do not add up to an effective community-wide preservation plan.
94
Thus, open space and habitat protection can be sited based on the chance decisions
of private landowners and unaccountable private groups, appropriately pursuing
their own interests and mission but not necessarily the wider and inclusive land use
policies that the public desires. Random creation of conservation land is not
consistent with modem notions of planning that supports broader, regional, even
cross-border approaches to land use planning.95 Private decision makers are not
90 See K.C. Mason, Lawmakers Want To Tighten Controls on Credit for Donated
Land, 44 ST. TAx NOTES 146, 146 (2007) (discussing Colorado HB 1361).
91 Id.
92 Section 1(1) of the Uniform Act merely defines the values inherent in a
conservation easement but does not provide a standard or measurement. UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A 170 (1996). Section 170(h) of the IRC
does provide some limitations for deductibility, but they set a floor, not an optimal level.
I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006). See supra Parts II.C. & III.B.l.a.
93 See, e.g., ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 52-81 (summarizing importance of
professional design principles); BYERS & PONTE, supra note 16, at 26-42; Wright, supra
note 84, at 491 (highlighting that conservation easements are not regulatory).
94 See Heidi J. Albers & Amy W. Ando, Could State-Level Variation in the Number of
Land Trusts Make Economic Sense?, 79 LAND EcON. 311, 312 (2003) ("[L]ocal land trusts
specializing in providing open space often do not consider the impact of their decisions on
regional conservation benefits.... [Ljack of coordination among [land trusts] has become
a serious problem.").
95 See ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 26-30, 132-34
(1994); Robert Fishman, The Death and Life of American Regional Planning, in
REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 107, 107-123 (Bruce Katz ed., 2000); see also Terri
Mashour et al., A Hedonic Analysis of the Effect of Natural Attributes and Deeds
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subject to the accountability of the electoral and regulatory processes that bind
governmental officials and decisions.
Even those nonprofits that might follow suggested best practices as to
easement selection operate as private entities. They are not subject to the
democratic, administrative, and legal constraints of a public land use planning
process. Permitting the outsourcing of local land use decisions from a public,
governmental procedure to a private entity raises serious concerns that will only
multiply as acreage under private conservation continues to increase.96 The
situation is exacerbated by in gross ownership, where an out-of-state,
geographically distant nonprofit that is removed from local issues and citizens,
controls patterns of land usage and development. 97 Indeed, it could corrode public
trust in the government if public officials abdicate difficult decisions to the private
sector.
Outsourcing public land issues to private organizations through the
conservation easement vehicle may also serve the interests of some elected
officials. Just as legislators sometimes delegate difficult and potentially unpopular
issues to agencies in order to avoid political fallout,98 they may be taking similar
steps in outsourcing land use decisions-a volatile area of particularly high interest
to voters99 to nonprofits. The public deserves better from its elected officials.
(c) Class Issues
As a related matter, there is the potential for class conflict and elitism in
conservation easement creation and enforcement. The effect, if not the intent, of a
pattern of conservation easements in a community can be "private large-lot
zoning."' 00 Limiting development on a large tract to a single (often existing) home
can prevent the building of affordable housing in the area or environmentally
Restrictions on the Value of Conservation Easements, 7 FOREST POL'Y & ECON, 771, 771
(2005) (describing the need for a state-planned program to deal with wildland-urban
interface issues).
96 See supra Part ll.B.
97 See supra Part II.D. 1.
98 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 82 (1993).
99 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES
1-3 (2005).
100 Consider, for example, the recent dispute between environmentalists seeking to
preserve scenery and those supporting the development of lower income housing for
immigrant laborers living in crowded conditions in Monterey, California. See Miriam
Jordan, In Tony Monterey County, Slums and a Land War, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26-27, 2006,
at Al.
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friendly unit developments. A pattern of conservation easements may actually
increase the exclusivity of the neighborhood and keep out newcomers.' 
0'
Despite his promotion of conservation easements, William H. Whyte noted
the inherent "muted class and economic conflicts" in this endeavor.10 2 He believed
that the donors of conservation easements would be the "gentry" and that their
interest was in natural areas in the countryside rather than open space for parks and
playgrounds. Thus, there is a divergence of interests on conservation questions and
without a public process to manage the friction, there is a risk that traditionally
powerful groups will be successful in privately imposing their vision. An
unrepresentative, parochial, homogenous, self-perpetuating nonprofit board of
directors of an organization that holds a conservation easement could exacerbate
potential negative class perceptions and effects. 10 3 People may associate with
whomever they wish, and they should be free to pursue their own happiness and
interests, but that does not mean that public land-policy should be delegated to
such private groups.
(d) Governmental Easements
The growth of private conservation easements should not mask the public's
positive attitudes towards governmentally owned conservation easements.
Moreover, data indicate that the public is willing to pay for the acquisition of such
easements. Seventy-seven of 1630 ballot measures providing funds for land
conservation between 1994 and 2005 were approved, providing $31.1 billion in
funding.104 Other reports show that citizens are willing to pay for governmental
acquisition of conservation easements. 0 5 While far from perfect, government has
'01 See Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724-25
(N.J. 1975) (declaring the obligation of towns to provide fair share of affordable housing
within the state).
102 Whyte, supra note 7, at 37.
103 See ALICE KORNGOLD, LEVERAGING GOOD WILL: STRENGTHENING NONPROFITS
BY ENGAGING BUSINESSES 138-142 (2005) ("The right board composition and structure in
the past is unlikely to be the right composition and structure today and tomorrow."); David
Lipton, Significant Private Foundations and the Need for Public Selection of Their
Trustees, 64 VA. L. REV. 779, 781 (1978); see also John B. Wrights, Cultural Geography
and Land Trusts in Colorado and Utah, 83 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 269, 277-278 (1993)
(finding factors in disparity in numbers and success of land trusts between areas: cultural
values, economic conditions, transient population, racial composition, and political
attitudes). The Land Trust Alliance's Standards and Practices, Standard 3B (2004) calls for
a board with "diverse skills, backgrounds and experiences." Land Trust Alliance,
http://www.lta.org/sp/land-truststandardsandpractices.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
The key to increasing diversity of perspective and background will be in adoption,
interpretation, and implementation of this and similar standards.
104 See Andrew J. Plantinga, The Economics of Conservation Easements, in LAND
POLICIES AND THEIR OUTCOMES 91-92 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2007).
105 See, e.g., Seong-Hoon Cho, David H. Newman & J.M. Bowker, Measuring Rural
Homeowners' Willingness to Pay for Land Conservation Easements, 7 FOREST POL'Y &
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been able to successfully plan and execute major infrastructure and public projects
over the generations. The citizenry could expect and require them to effectively
manage a conservation easement program.
2. Ongoing Nature
In addition to concerns at the time of creation, conservation easements present
challenges over the years of their existence. These include stewardship and the
perpetuity issue.
(a) Stewardship
While many organizations do a fine job of stewarding the conservation
easements that they hold, others do not fare as well. 10 6 Quality stewardship
requires periodic inspection and monitoring of the burdened property, discussions
with the fee landowner over general issues and incipient and actual violations, and
enforcement actions if resolution of disputes becomes impossible.10 7 Without
adequate stewardship, the conservation benefit to be enjoyed by the public
dissipates. Where a tax benefit accompanied the creation of the easement, this
means that the public has paid for a conservation advantage that has been
squandered through inaction or misjudgments of a nongovernmental organization.
The risk of stewardship failure is greatest, but not exclusive, to poorly funded,
inadequately governed nonprofits that lack the institutional and financial capital to
develop and maintain quality stewardship programs. The stewardship gap and loss
of publicly financed easements clearly has public policy ramifications.
There has been a concerted effort by leading conservation groups to provide
education and best practices for stewardship, as well as a recommendation that
nonprofits seek accompanying stewardship funds from donors of conservation
easements.10 8 This advice may help the situation-longitudinal studies will
ECON. 757, 768 (2005); Brad Haire, Georgians Want to Preserve Farmland, SOUTHEAST
FARM PRESS, May 19, 2004, http://southeastfarmpress.com/mag/farming-goergians-
preservefarmland/index.html (reporting on a University of Georgia survey); California
Growers Permanently Protect Land, AMERICAN NURSERYMAN, Mar. 1, 2002 (reporting on
a California program of easement acquisition and bond issues).
106 See Pidot, supra note 19, at 18-19; see also REPORT ON THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY, supra note 20, pt. 2, at 2-4 (criticizing monitoring efforts); id. exec.
summary, at 10 (suggesting loss of tax-exempt status and imposition of officer and director
excise taxes for failure to monitor and enforce).
107 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 137-143; BYERS & PONTE, supra note
16, at 143-168.
108 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 28; Byers & Ponte, supra note 16, at
126. For example, The Land Trust Alliance and Trust for New Hampshire Lands with
assistance from the National Trust for Historic Preservation published BRENDA LIND, THE
CONSERVATION EASEMENT STEWARDSHIP GUIDE: DESIGNING, MONITORING AND
ENFORCING EASEMENTS (1991).
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ultimately tell the story. But more importantly, these steps are not mandatory on
nonprofits and there is no evidence that they will be adopted and implemented
effectively, especially by those low-performing nonprofits who most need to
upgrade their operations.
(b) Perpetuity and Flexibility
Perhaps the greatest risk of conservation easements comes from what many
view as their most important attribute-their perpetual nature.'0 9 While advocates
of conservation easements seek to prevent changes in the land forever, it is unclear
whether this serves the public welfare in all situations. First, our sense of what is
ecologically and scenically valuable and the best methods to preserve such areas
evolve over time. Establishing immutable conservation easements may ultimately
frustrate conservation efforts in the future. 1 0
Moreover, history shows us that the constant shifts in the human condition,
technology, and economic arrangements have meant differing uses of land over the
generations. There may come a point in the future where a parcel of land subject to
a conservation easement is best suited for development as a commercial or
industrial property to provide employment in a economically depressed area, or for
affordable housing for moderate income residents in an area where little
developable land remains and large private homes dominate, or for some other
socially desirable purpose.
Typically decisions about developing undeveloped land are made in two
arenas: the market place and the public land use process. In the first, the parties
negotiate and reach agreement on the economic terms of a land transfer and
development deal. The deal is subject to being shaped in the second arena-the
zoning, subdivision, environmental regulation, and related land use control
processes-that gives the public a voice in the nature of the project. This two-track
development process functions today, albeit with high transaction costs and many
complaints, and is how socially desirable and economically feasible projects get
completed.
If, however, the land is subject to an existing conservation easement, this two-
track process may be unable to function. First, the presence of a conservation
easement held by a nonprofit creates a flawed market process, almost by definition.
Conservation organizations, appropriately devoted to their mission of land
conservation and opposed to land development, rarely enter market exchanges to
sell (that is release) their conservation rights. Conservation organizations may be
unwilling, regardless of the price, to sell their easement rights for various reasons:
109 Marketable title acts may provide no relief, even in those states that have adopted
such legislation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 7.16(5) (1998)
(exempting conservation easements from marketable title acts).
"o See Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the
Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 783-84 (2002).
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creation of complications for the donor under the IRC,"'1 concerns about their own
nonprofit tax status,' 12 doubts about the power to make such sales under their
governing documents, and misgivings that potential donors will no longer trust
them to hold conservation easements which will prevent them from accomplishing
their mission. 13
The market process may be further impeded. A low-functioning, merged, or
defunct nonprofit will likely not be a viable negotiating partner for an owner
seeking to purchase the release of a conservation easement.' 14 Moreover, since
conservation easements can now be held in gross, there may be a problem in
finding the easement owner because the owner is no longer tied to the
neighborhood, and could literally be located anywhere in the world. Thus, markets
may simply not be an answer to deal with removal of conservation easements.
Furthermore, the public does not get its usual input into the decision as to
whether the conservation easement will be relaxed to accommodate the public
interest in light of current conditions. Rather, the nonprofit owner will decide on its
own and in a nonpublic process whether to enforce its easement or yield to the
asserted public interest for flexibility.' 15 Thus, this key decision on local land use
control will be made outside of the public view and electoral process and without
public participation. The nonprofit may be based at a geographical distance from
the locality, without key facts and understanding of the issues. Notions of local,
democratic control over key land use decisions would be violated. 116 Issues of class
and elitism may influence decisions as well, perhaps not out of ill will but because
".. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(2) (2007) (placing limits on transfer by easement
donees, but allowing termination for changed conditions if proceeds are used for new
conservation purpose); Lisa Black & Courtney Flynn, Couple Sue Neighbor Over Use of
Conservation Land, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 2005, Metro, at 1 (describing concerns of nonprofit
by allowing modification of easement).
112 See Brad Wolverton, Conservation Charities Come under Questioning by the
Senate, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, June 23, 2005, at 4 (describing the intense
scrutiny facing these organizations). REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note
20, exec. summary, at 10-12 (suggesting that the Senate consider revoking tax-exempt
status and imposing excise taxes on officers and directors for failure to monitor).
113 In the event of a transfer or release of a conservation easement, the consideration
should be reinvested for conservation purposes and should be commensurate with any
original deduction taken by the easement donor, or else there would be a revenue loss to
the public by allowing a deduction and receiving no public benefit. See infra Part IV.D.5.
114 The organization may no longer be filing annual IRS Form 990s, making it hard to
locate.
11 Contrast this with the significant public process in the enforcement of
governmental conservation easements. See, e.g., Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark,
754 F.2d 446, 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
116 See Chattowah Open Land Trust, Inc. v Jones, 636 S.E.2d 523, 526-27 (Ga. 2006)
(removing land trust as holder of conservation easement as it is not approved to do business
in the state and substituted the county as holder; and dismissing objections that county may
have conflict in the future if it seeks to widen nearby road).
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the conservation easement owner lacks the opportunity to hear different viewpoints
on the issue.
1 17
Finally, perpetual conservation easements that lock in future generations, no
matter how well meaning, can violate the autonomy of future citizens. Land
ownership has played an important economic, social, and political role in America,
from the time of the first European settlers to the current day.1" 8 Land is also a
limited resource, and by its nature nonrenewable. While future citizens no doubt
will, and should, be grateful to the current generation for many actions that
conserve the environment for the future, the price cannot be the loss of the ability
of coming generations to make important decisions on land use for themselves
based on then-current needs, values, and tradeoffs. 119 The current generation must
allow adequate flexibility in conservation easements and cannot have the hubris to
think that the answer of today will be the answer of eternity. Thus, in order to meet
intergenerational responsibilities, a balance must, and can, be struck between the
conservation values of the current generation and the autonomy of future
generations.
IV. FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR IMPROVING THE LAW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
As demonstrated in Part III, there are significant concerns about the
devolution of key land use control decisions to private citizens and organizations.
Effective public policy decision making in the land use arena requires
accountability of actors. 120 That typically includes voter control of key decisions
and/or officials-a situation not present when independent nonprofits are making
policy. Transparency is also a precondition to accountability. 21 This requires
117 Consider the inherent class issues in the recent dispute in Main County, California
over an attempt by Habitat for Humanity to build four affordable housing units in the face
of criticism that this would increase traffic and be inconsistent with the neighborhood. Jim
Staats, Crowd Rips Habitat for Humanity Proposal, MARIN INDEPENDENT J., Jan. 17, 2007,
available at www.marinij.com/marin/ci_5029025.
118 See Korngold, supra note 64, at 1532-38.
119 This would violate the value of free alienability of land. See supra Part II.D.3.b.
120 See Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria Albino-War & Raju Singh, Subnational Public Fiscal
Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerations, in HANDBOOK OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM 408 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio eds. 2006) (discussing that fixed
terms of office, fair elections, independent judiciary, and auditors are essentials for
democracy); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM.
L. REv. 531, 539-41 (1998) (describing prevailing view of accountability); Eric Maskin &
Jean Tirole, The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government, 94 AMER. ECON.
REv. 1034, 1037 (2004) (describing literature on elections and accountability); Jerome B.
McKinney, Process Accountability and the Creative Use of Intergovernmental Resources,
41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 144 (1981) (evaluating costs and performance).
121 See Lindsay Stirton & Martin Lodge, Transparency Mechanisms: Building
Publicness into Public Services, 28 J.L. Soc'Y 471, 477-79 (2001) (suggesting four
transparency mechanisms: information, choice, representation, and voice); Dennis E.
2007] 1065
UTAH LAW REVIEW
standardized information flows-hardly present under the current system where
even data on the number, location, and acreage of existing conservation easements
cannot be readily ascertained. Transparency also requires a strong probability of
the detection of abuse and effective political and legal processes to resolve them;
given other demands on attorney-general and regulatory resources, it is unclear
how much detection and investigation of abuses is realistically possible under
current conditions. 122 Equity is another major concern of public policy decision
making; so, it is fair to ask whether private conservation organizations can
effectively meet the needs of an economically, socially, and racially diverse
America. Potential problems with stewardship and inflexibility present serious
challenges for future generations.
Yet, the reasons for validating and using private conservation easements
remain powerful: the growing conservation value, the benefits of private initiative,
efficiency gains, and freedom of choice for property owners. Conservation
easements are attractive to many landowners and citizens. Therefore, private
conservation easements in gross should continue to be authorized by the
legislatures and the courts, provided some changes are made to address the most
pressing issues. The following part describes five principles that, if adopted by
legislatures and courts, will strengthen the legal structure of conservation
easements for current and future generations.
A. Principle I: Restore Market Mechanisms in the Creation of
Conservation Easements
One of the claimed benefits of private conservation easements is that they
represent private rather than nongovernmental activities, based on consensual
rather than compelled transactions. Two aspects of conservation easements,
however, need to be reformed to address market distortions resulting from the
creation of conservation easements under the current legal regime: the federal tax
subsidy and the system for recording conservation easements.
1. Federal Tax Deductions
The current version of the IRC allows tax benefits for conservation easement
donations that might not bring matching public benefits. Deductions in those cases
create incentives that encourage transactions that yield an inefficient market
allocation of our limited land resources. The tax incentive system also frustrates
organized and public land use planning.
Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 182, 184-86 (1999) (describing
need for information).
122 See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 593, 622-24 & nn.245-52 (1999)
(describing limited actions by attorneys general, limited resources, and methods of
operation).
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Under § 170(h), a donation of a conservation easement qualifies for a
deduction if it is for a "conservation purpose." Such a purpose includes "the
preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by or education of the general
public"; "the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or
similar ecosystem"; or the preservation of open space for "the scenic enjoyment of
the general public or pursuant to a clearly delineated" governmental conservation
policy, and that "will yield a significant public benefit." 123 Qualifying for the open
space deduction thus requires either "scenic enjoyment" (the regulations provide
eight factors to determine this, using vague terminology since aesthetic
considerations are being described) 124 or consistency with a local, state, or federal
governmental policy (with the regulations requiring a focused and specific
government policy). 125 Then, with either open space easement scenario, the
easement must meet the "significant public benefit" test, with the regulations
describing eleven, again elastic, factors to consider in this determination. 126 Only a
few cases on natural habitat and open space easements have been reported,127 and
they do not provide much guidance to taxpayers or the IRS.
Beyond the administrative concerns engendered by such ambiguity, there is
the public subsidy question. Property rights and freedom-of-contract notions
support the removal of common law restraints on property owners' ability to create
conservation easements benefiting nonprofits. But this should not be conflated
with the separate question of whether the public should subsidize the free choice of
owners through a tax deduction. This is especially so when the benefits of the
conservation easement are somewhat amorphous and unverifiable, in particular
when compared to other conservation investments that the public could make.
Neither the natural habitat nor the open space conservation easement categories
require physical access to the public in order to qualify for deductibility.1 28 With
open space easements, the public must only have a view of part of the property, but
the extent of what they must be allowed to see and the benefit they receive are
unclear. 29 It is fair to ask what the public is getting in return for its investment,
especially since the choice of the property is being made by private parties outside
of a public land use plan or process.
123 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(i) to (iii) (2006).
124 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(i) to (ii) (2007).
125 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(i), (iii). Historic easements are a fourth category of
conservation easement. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) (2007).
126 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iv).
127 See, e.g., Glass v. Comm'r, 471 F.3d 698, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming finding
that habitat areas were "significant" over challenge of IRS); Turner v. Comm'r, 126 T.C.
299, 313-14 (2006) (finding open space requirement not met since easement did not
restrict building on buildable lots and there could be no building on the remaining acreage
as it was in a floodplain).




Moreover, tax subsidies for conservation easements motivate owner choices
in the marketplace. 130 Legislators must ensure that public benefits actually result
and that the subsidy does not distort market behavior and cause a suboptimal
allocation of our limited land resources. The worst-case scenario would be a
patchwork of conservation easements that has been purchased with mostly public
dollars, but that provides dubious public value, is not part of an overall
conservation plan, is controlled by a private entity, remains perpetually with the
property, and frustrates the legitimate land use, conservation, and development
goals of citizens for the land in their area. This is not a description of current
reality but the challenge is how to maintain the benefits of private conservation
easements and avoid these potential problems.
In contrast to the natural habitat and open space categories, an easement for
the preservation of a historically important land area or historic structure will
qualify for a deduction only if there is governmental process and action.
13 1
Claimed historic land must be listed in the National Register and a building must
be listed either in the National Register or be a part of a registered historic district
and certified by the Secretary of the Interior as being of historic significance.
132
The National Register process involves standards, administrative action, and public
participation that includes state historic preservation officers, a state review board
(comprised of professionals, property owners, and local officials), a federal
advisory council, and the National Park Service as decision maker.' 33 The
Secretary of the Interior also sets out specific requirements for administrative
certification of historic districts. 34 The presence of a governmental decision
maker, process, and articulated standards make it more likely that the public will
receive a benefit in exchange for the tax subsidy.
Therefore, the IRC should be amended to require local, state, or federal
governmental certification that the conservation easement serves a public
conservation purpose in order for its donor to receive a federal tax deduction. This
certification would be required only in the case of open space and natural habitat
conservation easements that do not include a meaningful right of physical access
by the public. 135 To be valid, the certification decision would have to be consistent
with a specific local, state, or federal conservation plan, and the governmental
agency must approve the particular easement on the specific parcel in question.
Although the federal deduction does not cost local and state treasuries, one would
expect them to be judicious in considering applications since the creation of an
easement will likely mean a reduction in state and local property tax revenues1
36
130 See Wilson & Strudler, supra note 83.
'' I.R.C. §§ 170(h)(4)(A)(iv), (h)(4)(C) (2007).
132 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(C).
133 See National Register Criteria for Evaluation, 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2007), available at
http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/listing.htm.
'14 See 26 U.S.C. § 47(c)(3)(B) (2007); 36 C.F.R. § 67.4.
13' Easements for education or recreation that grant public access should not require
governmental approval-the public access is a clear and tangible benefit.
136 See supra Parts II.C. & III.B. l.a.
[No. 41068
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: PROMOTING FLEXIBILITY
and since it will affect local land policy. In any case, preapproval is not currently
required for federal deductions, so it is hard to imagine how the tax expenditure
will increase under the proposed system.
The benefits of such a system are clear-improving the planning process for
conservation easement creation, ensuring that public funds are well spent, and
avoiding market distortions. 37 There are costs, but they are justified: transaction
costs will increase, as donors and nonprofits must go through a governmental
approval process, and it may slow down the process.' 38 Bureaucracy may grow.
The complication or ultimate denial of a deduction may also dissuade some owners
from creating conservation easements. 139 However, Massachusetts, which
presently requires governmental approval to create any conservation easement
even if a deduction is not sought, has been able to create a high number of
conservation easements even with that requirement in place. 140 Currently 0.9% of
Massachusetts land is controlled by conservation easements held by state and local
land trusts. This is a high number in comparison to other states that do not have
such an approval requirement, for example, New York (0.4%), Arizona (0.04%),
and Iowa (0.01%).1
41
The proposal here does not affect the validity of private conservation
easements in gross, just their potential deductibility under federal tax law. It is
different than the current Massachusetts legislative scheme that allows the creation
of a conservation restriction only if there is local and state governmental
approval.' 42 The Massachusetts legislation, while perhaps a good choice for that
state and its resources and culture, can be viewed in other places as unnecessarily
stifling the free choice of property owners to achieve their personal conservation
wishes. The proposal suggested above, however, simply provides that there is no
automatic right to a public subsidy for a conservation easement without public
access. The owner may still give freely without subsidy, or receive a deduction
137 The Senate Report for the 1980 legislation states that "the committee believes that
provisions allowing deductions for conservation easements should be directed at the
preservation of unique or otherwise significant land areas or structures." S. REP. No. 96-
1007, at 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736, 6745 (emphasis added).
138 If delays become a problem, the Code might provide a presumed approval after a
set period of time after an application.
139 Another alternative that would address concerns about validity of the deduction
under current standards but not the issue of governmental planning would be pre-approval
of deductions by the IRS. See generally REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra
note 20, exec. summary, at 11.
140 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 31-32 (LexisNexis 2007).
4" These percentages are compiled from 2005 CENSUS REPORT, supra note 20, at 20
chart 5, and U.S. Census Bureau, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book: 2006, tbl. E-1,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/smadb/TableE-01.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2007) (the
factor of 640 acres per square mile was used to convert area figures).
142 The drafters of the Uniform Act specifically rejected governmental approval to




without the necessity of governmental approval by donating a fee or an easement
with meaningful public access.
143
Despite the intensive congressional investigation and study of conservation
easements and abuses,' 4" the 2006 tax reform legislation made only few and
insubstantial changes in the deductibility of conservation easements. 145 A more
serious response, as suggested here, is needed.
2. Unclogging the Market
Information is a prerequisite for effective functioning of policymakers and
markets. Currently, the recording system does not provide good data about the
ownership of conservation easements. 146 We lack good figures on key conservation
easement questions: the number of easements, the amount of acreage, current
holders of interests (that is, assignees), and the nature of the restrictions.
Developing this data would enhance the public discourse about the costs and
benefits of conservation easements, enable better decision making by legislatures
and officials, and more clearly identify restrictions to potential market players.
Therefore, all jurisdictions should require separate recording books for
conservation easements within the county recorder offices.
Enhanced data available from a recording book requirement will also serve
the antirestrictions policy. This information will enable policymakers to easily
recognize the full range of restrictions, allowing them to take the necessary actions
taken to limit the dead hand.147 Additionally, transaction costs generated by
perpetual, in gross interests can be reduced, 48 preventing the frustration of the
efficient operation of the land transactions system. Costs to establish such a book
system for conservation easements on a going-forward basis should be minimal
and are worth the investment.
B. Principle II.- Enhance Easement Holder Governance and Operations
1. Stewardship and Enforcement
The many responsible, effective nonprofits holding conservation easements
have been unfairly tarnished by the improper acts of a few. Concerns about
nonprofit holders of conservation easements tend to focus on a lack of capability to
143 Other aspects of IRC § 170 that have received recent attention have been proposals
to prevent appraisal abuses, see supra note 86, and proposals to accredit conservation
organizations, see REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 20, exec. summary,
at 11.
'44 See REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 20.
145 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1219, 120 Stat. 1083,
1083-1086 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1219) (placing penalties on abusive appraisals).
146 See supra Part II.B.
147 See supra Part II.D.3.b.
148 See supra Part II.D.2.
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effectively manage, monitor, and enforce the easements and frivolous waiver of
easement provisions-with the result that the benefit of the easements and the
public subsidy can be lost.
149
Various attempts have been made to address these issues. In order for a
donor's deduction to be valid, the IRC requires that a donee organization must
have the resources to enforce the restriction, 150 and the easement must provide for
a right of access to the property by the organization to monitor compliance.' 5 ' Still,
there is nothing to guarantee that the organization will be effective, especially over
the long term.
Congressional staff has also raised the possibility of accreditation of easement
holders in order to address stewardship and enforcement problems, 152 although
such a provision did not appear in the 2006 reform legislation. The Land Trust
Alliance has developed a voluntary program of accreditation for land trusts and
detailed standards and practices, and is currently rolling out the accreditation
process through a lottery system, as demand is high. 153 This program may increase
operational quality of those organizations that receive certification. Still,
participation in the program is only voluntary, and the poorer performing
organizations are likely to avoid the costs and transparency that accreditation will
bring. Moreover, it is unclear that the fact that an organization has received
accreditation will affect the actions of a donor who is primarily motivated by the
tax deduction. As long as the federal income tax bar is cleared, best practices may
not be of interest. 1
54
The solution may come through the power of attorneys general in the various
states to intervene, as the representatives of the public, in matters related to
charitable gifts and nonprofit organizations and trusts.155 An attorney general could
enforce a conservation easement when a nonprofit fails to do so or take a position
on enforcement contrary to the nonprofit on modification of the easement where
the public interest requires. Additionally, the attorney general could pursue breach
of fiduciary duty actions against nonprofit board members where appropriate. The
possibility of action against board members can be an effective and necessary
motivator of board behavior.
149 See supra Part III.B.2.a.
150 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2007).
15' 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).
152 REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 20, exec. summary, at 11.
This raises many questions, such as who would administer such a program? at what cost?
with what demonstrable benefits?
'13 See Land Trust Accreditation Commission, http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org
(last visited Dec. 30, 2007) (an independent program of the Land Trust Alliance); Maggie
I. Jaruzel, Land Trusts Seek Self-Regulation Through Accreditation, MOTT MOSAIC, Apr.
2006, at 12, 12, available at http://www.mott.org/upload/pdfs/current/mott%/20mosaic/
mosaicv5nl .pdf.
154 See supra note 84.
'55 See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400,
1463 (1998); Gary, supra note 122, at 593.
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There are some difficulties with achieving attorney general intervention. First,
customs in the various states have meant different levels of intervention by
attorneys general over the years. 156 Second, there is the cost to the attorneys
general of enforcement, especially given other, arguably more serious, demands on
the budget. Since stewardship and enforcement of conservation easements have
been an ongoing concern and a major public issue, it might be possible to attach a
special fee to the creation of these interests to go to an attorney general monitoring
and enforcement fund.
Third, some jurisdictional issues would have to be resolved. Consider the
example of a Virginia nonprofit that holds a conservation easement on Montana
land, and the nonprofit fails to monitor and enforce. The attorney general of
Virginia may not be interested or well informed about the land dispute in Montana,
but would be concerned about governance issues of the nonprofit. The attorney
general of Montana, on the other hand, might be interested in the land but not in
ongoing governance issues of the nonprofit. The interests of both states would
need to be accommodated and protected.
Finally, there is again the issue of whether the attorney general even knows of
the existence and terms of a given conservation easement within the jurisdiction.
To address this, the recorder of deeds should be required to notify the attorney
general of conservation easements that are presented for recording. 
157
2. Ability to Compromise
Nonprofit operations and culture create another set of issues. As discussed
above, 158 sometimes it may be necessary in the public interest for a nonprofit to
amend or release a covenant. Nonprofit directors may fear to do so, out of a
concern over IRS regulations governing easement holders 59 or language in the
156 See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 950-53 (2004).
157 There has been some suggestion that third parties, as opposed to the attorney
general, should be empowered to enforce private conservation easements. See Carol Necole
Brown, A Time to Preserve: A Call for Formal Private-Party Rights in Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 40 GA. L. REv. 85, 126 (2005); Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party
Enforcement of Conservation Easements, 29 VT. L. REv. 757, 759 (2005). This, however,
would lead to increased litigation and associated costs. Moreover, this would mean the
further privatization of a public land issue, as the public's interest would be represented not
by a public official but by a private citizen perhaps having different perspectives and goals.
The cases are unclear on the third party standing issue. See, e.g., Spirit of Sage Council v.
City of Pasadena, No. BC267782, 2006 WL 3199929, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006)
(rejecting third party standing); Burgess v. Breakell, No. CV-95-0068033, 1995 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2290, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1995); Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v.
Bright Par 3 Assocs., L.P., No. E2003-01982-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 419720, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2004) (finding standing for all citizens within the state). Interestingly, all
three cases are not released for reporting and are thus subject to citation limitation rules.
158 See supra Part III.B.2.b.
159 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A- I (c)(2), (g)(6) (2007).
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easement document or organizational documents. Statements such as the one from
Senator Charles Grassley, then chair of the Senate Finance Committee, that
"modifying these easements is a huge no-no"' 160 can intimidate nonprofit directors
from making appropriate decisions in the public interest.
Obtaining declaratory judgments that board actions are permitted is a
cumbersome, expensive, and impractical process. Directors insurance and lawyers'
opinion letters may give some comfort. Better methods must be developed, though,
to empower directors to act in those rare instances when the public interest requires
deviation from the terms of a conservation easement. Judicial or legislative
development of an expanded concept of fiduciary duty, that would encompass
flexibility and not conservatism, may be a good first step.
C. Principle III: Protect Expectations of Future Generation Owners
A number of reported cases interpret the disputed meaning of language in
conservation easements. In developing rules of interpretation of conservation
easements, the courts should remember that these are perpetual interests that will
be enforced against successor owners to the servient parcel. They must protect the
interests of future generation owners living with these restrictions.
"General" contracts (as opposed to real property agreements) usually are
enforced between the original parties to the transaction. In such cases, there is
some divergence of judicial approach on interpretation of the agreement. Some
courts prefer to look to the language of the document exclusively if at all possible,
believing that this best reflects the parties' intent-a "strict construction," "plain
language," or "objective" approach.1 61 Others, however, place greater weight on
extrinsic evidence, reflecting an attitude that particular words can be imprecise or
can have special meanings to the original parties-a "subjective" approach.
1 62
Regardless of the particular view controlling "general" contracts,
interpretation of conservation easements should follow a strict-construction
approach. Over time there will be successor owners of the burdened parcel 63 and
in some cases the easement right may be transferred to another organization.1
64
160 Black & Flynn, supra note 111, at 1.
161 See Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 859-60 (7th Cir.
2002).
162 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212, cmt. b (1981).
163 See, e.g., Southbury Land Trust, Inc. v. Andricovich, 757 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2000); Sagalyn v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107, 109
(D.C. App. 1997); Redwood Constr. Corp. v. Doombosch, 670 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561-62
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see also Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Dev. v. Mullen, 886 A.2d 900,
903 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (occupant of property subject to conservation easement
controlled by its terms).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Blackman, 613 S.E.2d 442, 445-49 (Va. 2005)
(validating an easement transferred to the National Park Service); see also UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 173 (permitting assignment of easement
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Successors will likely have no knowledge of extrinsic evidence not appearing in
the language of the recorded document, and should not be bound by information of
which they are unaware. Instead, the courts should, whenever possible, interpret
conservation easement language involving successors by relying exclusively on the
express language of the document. In rare cases the courts may have to allow
extrinsic evidence when the language does not produce a meaning. The courts in
these situations, though, should not allow evidence that was unknown to the
successor.
165
Moreover, the court should not be aiming to establish the original meaning of
the language to the initial parties. Rather, it should look at the point in time that the
successor purchased and determine what a reasonable successor should have
thought that the original agreement meant, based on the language of the recorded
instrument and, if necessary, extrinsic evidence known to the successor. This will
protect the legitimate expectations of successors of the burdened parcel. It also
places the burden on the easement owner (who may continue to own the easement
perpetually) to make the terms of the easement clear and to spell out any special
understandings on the face of the original document for successor servient
purchasers to see before committing.
Unfortunately, various courts apply "general" contract interpretation
principles to conservation easement cases too glibly, without recognizing the
successor issue involved in recorded conservation easements. They refer to the
contest as a matter of contract ambiguity, interpretation, and extrinsic evidence.
Even when a successor is involved, they still adhere to the bilateral, general
contract language. 
166
Fortunately, despite these troubling articulations, some cases have strictly
applied the language of conservation easements and rejected attempts to broadly
read the words or bring in other understandings to alter the "clear" terms of the
agreement. Sometimes this close reading protects the servient owner from a
conservation easement owner's attempt to restrain activities.' 67 For example, in
one case, a nonprofit conservation organization sought to bar the building of an
additional house on the burdened property for the easement grantor's son. 168 The
benefit); BYERS & PONTE, supra note 16, 169-173 (describing use of back-up holders of
easements).
165 See Sagalyn, 651 A.2d at 797 (rejecting appraisal report as providing meaning in
enforcement against second generation owner as it was prepared only by the grantor and
was for tax purposes).
166 See, e.g., Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d at 1265 (relying on language in the
document and zoning regulations to interpret "where the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous" (citing Tallmadge Bros. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., 746 A.2d
1277, 1288 (Conn. 2000))); Redwood Constr. Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (involving
successor owner of burdened parcel, but court stated "where, as here, a contract is
unambiguous on its face," as a result no external evidence was needed) (emphasis added).
167 See, e.g., Sagalyn, 651 A.2d at 798 (refusing to construe "extension" to bar
addition of dog run and canopy).
168 Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d at 1266.
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court found that the "plain language" allowing the construction of "an additional
dwelling unit" for a family member did not require it to be situated in an already
existing building but could be new, free-standing construction. 169 Sounding
antirestrictions strains, the courts stated that "a restrictive covenant must be
narrowly construed and ought not to be extended by implication. '1 70 This strict
reading appropriately balances the competing interests by protecting the legitimate
expectations of the servient owner and not creating land ties where none were
intended. If the conservation group had wanted to bar new construction, "they
easily could have accomplished this by adding certain language to the
restriction.
1 7 1
In other cases, a narrow reading of the language serves the conservation
purpose. For example, in a case involving a conservation easement granted by a
predecessor to the local government, the court ruled that a current life tenant could
not build a pool as it was a "structure on or above the ground" and barred by the
language.172 A pool would also conflict with the grantor's purpose stated in the
easement document to "restrict the use of [the property] and retain it
predominantly in its natural, scenic and open condition."
1 73
Perhaps the strongest example of strict enforcement of a conservation
easement's terms against a successor involved the purchase of a property subject to
an existing restriction limiting the use of the property to farming, wildlife
sanctuary, or nature conservation area.' 74 The purchasers obtained a building
permit for a 4900-square-foot house and the defendants brought an action to
prevent construction. During the pendency of the suit, the purchasers built their
residence. The court ultimately found for the defendants, and ordered the
purchasers to vacate their home and to remove it. The court granted the defendants
the right to enter and remove the house if the purchasers failed to do so. The
defendants contracted with a demolition company to remove the house and the
company demolished the residence. This strict application of the conservation
169Id. at 1265-66.
170 Id. at 1265 (quoting 5011 Cmty. Org. v. Harris, 548 A.2d 9, 11 (Conn. App. Ct.
1988)); accord Sagalyn, 651 A.2d at 798.
171 Southbury Land Trust, Inc., 757 A.2d at 1266; see also Conrad v. Mattis, No.
CV0005959545, 2000 WL 33115395, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2000) (noting that
there were "some differences of opinion as to the exact definition of 'clear-cutting' but
finding, based on the dictionary, governmental regulations, and academic definitions that it
did not include the cutting of some trees to put in a vegetable garden where use as a farm or
garden was specifically permitted by the easement).
172 Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 865-66 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995);
see also United States v. Ponte, 246 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78-79 (D. Me. 2003) (finding that
distance should be measured horizontally, according to the prevailing custom, and so
holding that the easement has been violated).
113 Goldmuntz, 651 N.E. 2d at 865; see also Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic
Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110, 1113 (D.C. App. 1994) (finding that building that obscured
fagade violated specific language of easement).
174 Natale v. Schwartz, 151 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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easement is noteworthy in that it was enforced against a second-generation owner
(apparently deemed to have consented to the easement by purchasing with notice),
it yielded a significant financial loss for the owner, and it resulted in the
destruction of a residence, often an area of special protection for American
courts. 175
When the plain meaning of the easement language is not clear, care must be
used in considering extrinsic evidence when successors are involved. In one case,
the court had to decide whether the consolidation of the several lots into a new
record lot would violate a conservation easement provision barring "subdivision"
of lots that had been granted by a preceding owner to a nonprofit organization.
176
The current owners argued that "subdivide" has a plain and ordinary meaning of
cutting a larger tract of land into smaller pieces. The court stated that the
jurisdiction followed an "objective" view of interpretation and written language
would control, but that the context in which the word was used shapes its meaning.
Thus, the court held that "subdivide" is susceptible to different meanings than the
owner's asserted dictionary definition, and thus ambiguous. To resolve the
ambiguity, the court looked to the local planning regulation that defined
"subdivision" to include assembly of lots finding that "the parties knew or should
have known the meaning of 'subdivide' in real estate at the time the Easement was
created."'' 77 Presumably, "parties" referred to the original parties to the easement.
The real question should have been whether the successors knew or could have
known the terms of the regulation. Assuming that they could have (for example, if
the statutory definition of subdivide remained the same at the time of purchase,
they should have been aware of the broader meaning of "subdivide" in real estate
transactions), then the result in the case is correct though the articulation (that is,
"[original] parties") needs clarifying.
Closely interpreting conservation easements serves the goals of freedom of
contract while not saddling buyers with unknown or unknowable restrictions. In
this way, parties can freely bargain-and count on enforcement of their deals. At
the same time, the burden is on them to make clear the extent of the restriction so
that future owners will not be caught unaware, thus serving the spirit of the
antirestrictions policy.
D. Principle IV: Achieving Flexibility Through Expanded Modification and
Termination Doctrines
The law of covenants provides several doctrines that may be useful in
addressing perpetual conservation easements. Again, note the irony that despite the
171 See John Leland Mechem, The Peasant in His Cottage: Some Comments on the
Relative Hardship Doctrine of Equity, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 139, 144 (1955) ("[Tlhe basic
concept, that private ownership of a dwelling house is still the most inviolable of all
property rights.").
176 Sagalyn v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107, 108-09
(D.C. App. 1997).177 Id. at 112.
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easement misnomer, the law of covenants, not easements, has developed doctrines
to deal with outmoded negative restrictions on land. While traditional doctrines of
changed conditions, cy pres, and relative hardship may provide some assistance in
dealing with outmoded conservation easements, a revitalized doctrine barring
enforcement of covenants violating public policy may provide the most powerful
tool.
1. Changed Conditions
First, the doctrine of changed conditions provides that the courts will not
enforce a covenant if the conditions since it was created have so changed that
enforcement will not bring its intended benefits. 178 A typical case involves a
subdivision burdened by residential building and use restrictions, with the goal of
creating a quiet living situation. Internal changes, such as a strong pattern of
nonenforcement against breaches or a governmental taking of a large portion of the
subdivision, may make it impossible to achieve the original residential goal.1 79 The
doctrine of changed conditions would bar enforcement of the covenant against a
new violator of the covenant.
Changed conditions theory could be applied to terminate a conservation
easement.1 80 For example, when surrounding pollution and development becomes
so great that a conservation easement on a property to protect habitat for migrating
species no longer can accomplish its purpose, or a historic stand of trees is
destroyed by fire. These will not be easy cases to make, however. Proponents of
the easement will argue that any open space is valuable and especially necessary
when surrounding conditions have worsened.1 81 Moreover, the Third Restatement
of Property has a specific provision that prohibits the application of changed
conditions to private conservation servitudes unless certain conditions are met.182 It
provides that if the particular conservation purpose becomes impracticable, then it
should be modified for other conservation purposes based on the cy pres doctrine;
and if it can no longer accomplish any conservation purpose, it may be terminated
with damages and restitution.
83
Most importantly, though, the changed conditions doctrine, even if applied by
the courts, does not address the fundamental public policy choices raised in this
Article. The changed conditions theory provides a means to deal with covenants
that are obsolete and serve little or none of their original purpose. It does not,
however, provide a mechanism for balancing a strong public interest in a new use
178 KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 453-455.
179 Id. at 456-462.
180 Komgold, supra note 7, at 485-486. See Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts,
Conservation Easements, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523,
2523-24 (2006); Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of
Changed Conditions, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1188 (1989).
"' Komgold, supra note 7, at 485.
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 7.11 (2000).
183 Id. § 7.11(1), (2).
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for the land (perhaps for necessary industrial development, affordable housing, or
health care facilities) against the conservation value exemplified by the easement
held by a private organization.
2. Cy Pres
The doctrine of cy pres, a rule of construction borrowed from charitable trusts
that instructs that the terms of a will should be interpreted to conform to the will of
the testator when literal construction is impracticable or impossible, can provide an
important method to adjust a conservation easement where the particular purpose
of the easement has likewise become impossible or impracticable. 184 Applying the
doctrine, the court will adapt the easement to another conservation purpose
compatible with the overall conservation goal.'85 This might even mean the sale of
the easement and the transfer of the conservation purpose to another parcel of
land. 186 Cy pres brings some desirable suppleness into perpetual land interests, and
should be embraced by the courts. But it too does not provide a solution to the
concerns raised in this Article. Indeed, the term "cy pres" comes from the
"Norman French phrase cy pros comme possible, meaning 'as nearly as
possible.' ' 187 The doctrine contemplates incremental changes from the original
instrument, not the broader deviations to serve the public interest that may be
required under the analysis suggested in this Article.
3. Doctrine of Relative Hardship
The doctrine of relative hardship may provide some support for a court
attempting to balance the public interest in relaxing a conservation easement
against the holder's attempt to strictly enforce the restriction, though some shifts in
judicial attitude would be required to make this possible. The relative hardship
doctrine is quite amorphous and stated in a variety of ways by the courts. A
common formulation is that a court will not specifically enforce a covenant and
limit the remedy to damages if the harm of the injunction will be disproportionate
to the benefits of specific enforcement.' 
88
Despite its elasticity, the relative hardship doctrine as presently conceived
cannot be easily used to deny enforcement of a conservation easement due to
public concerns because the current formulations of the relative hardship doctrine
do not include an express consideration of the public interest. 189 Rather, the courts
describe relative hardship as a matter between two individuals, sometimes even
184 See id. § 7.11(1); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation
Easements: A Case Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1031,
1040 (2006); McLaughlin, supra note 7.
185 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 7.1, cmt. b.
186 See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 436.
187 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 738 (7th ed. 2005).
188 For a complete discussion of the rule, see KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 462-470.
189 Id. at 468.
[No. 41078
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: PROMOTING FLEXIBILITY
specifically rejecting the public factor.190 The relative hardship doctrine lacks a
stated dimension of the societal interest, unlike the Second Restatement of Torts,
which asserts that "[t]he interests of third persons and the public are factors to be
considered in determining the appropriateness of an injunction against tort." 191
This broad standard of the Second Restatement of Torts is reflected in nuisance
cases, giving courts significant latitude to balance competing interests, which is not
found in the relative hardship doctrine.'
92
The relative hardship doctrine can become a meaningful and legitimate tool to
balance the public interest against conservation values if two shifts in judicial
attitude and doctrine occur. First, currently courts routinely state that covenants
(which would include conservation easements) are automatically enforceable by
injunction even though no irreparable harm or monetary loss can be shown.1 93 The
reality, though, is that courts would need to remember that while injunctions are
generally awarded, they are not and need not be granted in every case. Injunctions
are a doctrine of equity and can be refused in a covenant action based on the
equities of the situation. 194 Rote repetition of the typical result (that is, an
injunction) does not make it a universal rule; rather, it may serve to cloud the law
and confuse courts and actors by writing the flexibility of the courts out of the
equation.
Second, the courts and legislatures need to expand the doctrine of relative
hardship to include express consideration of the public interest in the requested
injunction. Thus, in a conservation easement injunction case, the court would have
to consider the public's interest in specific enforcement and not only the positions
of the conservation organization and the servient owner. If the court denied an
injunction and awarded damages, the conservation organization could use such
funds on another parcel consistent with the conservation goals of the original
easement. This would maintain the donor's intent where the easement had been
contributed, prevent the loss of the tax subsidy, and be consistent with the
organization's mission and governing documents.
190 See, e.g., Wier v. Isenberg, 420 N.E.2d 790, 793 (111. App. Ct. 1981) ("[A] court
does not balance the equities as it would in an ordinary nuisance case or in a request for
rezoning."); Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension of Snyder v. Sahlem, 172 N.E.
455, 457 (N.Y. 1930) ("Neither at law nor in equity is it written that a license has been
granted to religious corporations, by reason of the high purpose of their being, to set
covenants at naught.").
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 942 (1977). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.
(SERVITUDES) § 8.3(1) (2000) comment (e) now suggests that courts should consider the
costs and benefits to the parties, third parties, and the public when forming remedies for
covenant violation.
192 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) (denying
injunction and awarding one-time damages for nuisance caused in the past and future by
dust from cement plant).
193 KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 434.
194 For example, laches and unclean hands by the applicant. See id. at 450-453.
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4. Covenants Violating Public Policy
Courts often state that they will not enforce covenants that violate public
policy. 195 Many of these declarations are dicta and there are few decisions where
courts actually void a covenant on public policy grounds. 196 One line of cases,
though, could be relied upon by a court seeking to modify or terminate a
conservation easement that conflicts with fundamental local land use policy. These
cases found a public policy, clearly articulated in state statutes and regulations,
favoring group homes for the disabled rather than institutional care. These courts
relied on this public policy to refuse enforcement of private covenants that barred
group homes, 197 despite the countervailing public policy favoring property rights
and residential subdivision developments. 1
98
Conservation easements, in contrast, do not violate public policy but rather
are favored by public policy as evidenced by express, statutory authorization of
these interests. As a general matter, conservation easements are beneficial and
should be enforced. There may be, however, rare occasions where another major,
clearly articulated state policy-such as one favoring economic development,
affordable housing, or public planning-is threatened by the continued
enforcement of the original conservation easement. In such a situation, the court
would have to balance the competing public interests, perhaps to the disfavor of
conservation goals, when deciding on the enforcement or modification of a
particular conservation easement. This would be a legitimate expression of the
principle that courts should not enforce covenants that violate public policy.
5. Termination and the IRC
Judicial application of changed conditions, expansion of the relative hardship
doctrine, and a prohibition on covenants violating public policy would have federal
tax ramifications in the case of a donated easement. The IRS regulations seek to
prevent a revenue loss in the event that "a subsequent unexpected change in the
conditions surrounding the property.., makes impossible or impractical the
continued use of the property for conservation purposes." 199 The original deduction
by the donor will not be affected as long as the restrictions are extinguished in a
judicial proceeding and the nonprofit's portion of the proceeds are used in a
19' Id. at 397.
196 Id. at 397-98.
19' See, e.g., Welsch v. Goswick, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Sate v.
District Court, 609 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Mont. 1980); Crane Neck Ass'n, Inc. v. New York
City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 804 (1984). But see Mills v. Kubena, 685 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. App. 1985);
Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 824 P.2d 495, 499 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992), aff'd, 854 P.2d 1072 (Wash. 1993).
198 See Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners
Associations: For Reformation Not Termination, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 513, 518.
'99 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) (2007).
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manner consistent with the conservation purpose of the original easement. While
the regulation specifically contemplates termination due to changed conditions, the
theory of the provision-prevention of revenue loss-would make it similarly
applicable in situations of termination or rejection of specific enforcement under
the relative hardship doctrine or the prohibition against violation of public policy.
E. Principle V." Preserving the Public's Power of Eminent Domain
Like other covenants 2°° (and, for that matter, easements 201), private
conservation easements are subject to being taken via eminent domain.20 2 Various
conservation easement statutes even expressly provide for taking by eminent
domain.20 3 With appurtenant covenants, compensation is usually the difference in
value of the benefited parcel with and without the covenant.20 4 With covenants in
gross, such as conservation restrictions, there is no benefited land so an alternative
measure is used: the difference in the value of the burdened land with and without
the covenant. 20 5 This alternative, though, focuses exclusively on the burdened land
and may not capture the ecological value and benefit of the conservation easement
to the nonprofit easement owner.20 6
200 See KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 473-476.
201 See id. at 268-71.
202 See Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Redev. Agency of City of Bristol, 321
A.2d 469, 473 (Conn. 1975) (requiring compensation for eminent domain action that
invalidated an in gross building restriction, much like a conservation easement); BYERS &
PONTE, supra note 16, at 191-92.
203 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2007);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-36(c) (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1010(F) (2006). See UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1996) (providing that a
conservation easement can be "terminated" like other "easements"); id. prefatory note, 12
U.L.A. 166 ("The Act neither limits nor enlarges the power of eminent domain. . .
204 See KORNGOLD, supra note 52, at 475.
205 Id. The measure is the same when calculating the value of a (true) easement in
gross for taking purposes. See id. at 270. See generally, Gregory Bialecki, What Must the
Taking Authority Pay for Land Subject to a Conservation Easement?, THE BACK FORTY,
July/Aug. 1990, at 6 (stating the valuation procedure for conservation easements should be
the same as covenants in gross); Gregory Bialecki, Eminent Domain Takings of Land
Subject to Conservation Easements, THE BACK FORTY, Sept. 1990, at 8-9 (describing the
method of valuation for "easement in gross in the context of eminent domain proceedings"
and its potential application to valuing conservation easements).
206 Section 170(h) and the accompanying IRS Regulations do not provide for
distribution of proceeds on condemnation. While not required by IRS regulations, good
stewardship and corporate fiduciary norms would appear to require the organization to
invest the proceeds from the taking in new conservation activities. One would think that
there would be a requirement for the proceeds to be used for conservation purposes, as in a
case of a court approved voluntary transfer due to impracticability or impossibility. See 26
C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(2) (2007).
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It is essential that government have the ability to assert its eminent domain
power to take conservation easements for compensation. This will allow
communities to inject flexibility into past plans imposed on them by private
organizations and to address through a public process the new communal
challenges that inevitably will develop in the future. Eminent domain has long
provided the collective with a necessary tool to remedy errors of the past. The
state's ability to bring an eminent domain action also offsets the landowner's
monopoly power over her land, and thus facilitates bargaining between the
government and the owner to resolve the issue. Eminent domain power, well-
exercised and under rigorous judicial supervision, is essential to current and future
generations.
This important governmental power has been under siege, however, since the
decision of the Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London.20 ' Kelo involved a
comprehensive redevelopment plan on ninety waterfront acres to create new
commercial, retail, residential, and recreational space. The plan had been through
an extensive public process and received governmental approval. The purpose of
the plan was to revitalize the declining economic condition of the city. Petitioners,
owners of some residential properties, challenged the attempt to take their land
pursuant to the plan, claiming that there was no "public use" under the Fifth
Amendment. Rather, they argued that the land would be owned and used by
private parties after the redevelopment and that economic development was not a
legitimate public use for which a taking could be made.
The Court rejected the Petitioners' claims. It found that the area did not need
to be "blighted" to find a public use and that the local legislative determination to
implement "economic rejuvenation" was entitled to deference. Moreover, while
the land ultimately ended up in the hands of private parties, Kelo did not involve
the improper situation of government using its taking power in an ad hoc manner
to favor one individual owner over another. Rather, the entire public benefited by
the comprehensive development and plan in Kelo.
There has been a huge and ongoing popular, legal, and scholarly backlash
against the Kelo decision. Many state legislatures have passed restrictions on
eminent domain power of state and local government, often barring takings for
economic development purposes.20 8 Voters in November 2006 approved similar
207 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
208 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(d) (2006) (prohibiting the use of eminent
domain for the purpose of economic development); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-107(b)
(2006) (prohibiting eminent domain for economic and tax revenue enhancement and
requiring proof of blight); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2007)
(prohibiting use of eminent domain where it is merely a pretext for the transfer of the
property to a private party). For a list of various state enactments, see the website of the
American Planning Association, http://www.planning.org/legislation/eminentdomain/
edlegislation.htm. See also Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of
New London, Babbitt v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U.
CINN. L. REv. 663, 699-702 (2006); Donald E. Sanders & Patricia Pattison, The Aftermath
ofKelo, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 157, 164-70 (2005).
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ballot measures.209 State courts have rejected the Kelo interpretation by reading
their state constitutions to bar takings for economic development or unless the area
is blighted.210 Popular press and scholarly opinion have generally blasted Kelo.
21'
Contrary to the critics, Kelo was decided correctly. As a matter of
constitutional law, the Court provided plausible support for its decision.212 As a
matter of public policy, the Court made the right choice, providing government
with the tool necessary to meet changing needs and correct the errors of the past.
The alternative would be a frozen land utilization pattern, with ill effects for the
present and future citizenry. Conservation easements provide an important
illustration. Eminent domain is necessary to address those rare situations when an
essential public need-for example, economic development or affordable
housing-cannot go forward because of a prior privately made arrangement. It
allows for a public process to vindicate communal values and protect flexibility.
Such a utilitarian argument may be rejected by pure property rights proponents, but
the Fifth Amendment expressly contemplates limitations on private property based
on a notion of the social contract.
This does not mean that the government should use eminent domain
cavalierly to take conservation easements or any other private property rights.
Takings should involve careful planning, deliberations, and public debate. The
constitutional protections outlined in Kelo and procedural safeguards must be
followed. Given the severity of the action and the fact that government must pay
"just compensation," takings should be a rare last resort by government.
209 GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, VII (passed, set out in GA. H.R. 1306); S.C. CONST. art.
XIV, § 5 (passed, set out in S.C. S.B. 1030).
210 See, e.g., Centene Plaza Redev. Corp. v. Mint Props., 225 S.W.3d 431, 435 n.3
(Mo. 2007) (holding that Missouri Constitution prevents taking primarily for benefit of
another private party); Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d
447, 469 (N.J. 2007) (stating that property that was "not fully productive" was not
"blighted"); Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1140-41 (Ohio 2006) (holding that an
economic benefit alone is insufficient to satisfy the public use requirement).
211 See, e.g., Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic
Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L.Q. 623, 638 (2006)
(arguing that economic development takings may cause environmental harm); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 355, 361 (2005);
Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Horatory Fluff"?, 33
PEPP. L. REV. 335, 336 (2006); Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use " Requirement in Eminent
Domain: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 62 (2006); John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al; Martin Kasindorf, Voters Get a Say on Land Rights, USA
TODAY, Sept. 24, 2006, at A1; Carla T. Main, The "Blight" Excuse, WALL ST. J., June 30,
2005, at Al1; Editorial, They Paved Paradise, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at A12. There
are few scholarly articles supporting Kelo. One noteworthy exception is Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Usefulness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006).
212 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1954) (stating that the concept of
public welfare is broad and inclusive as the values it represents are "spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary").
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V. CONCLUSION
Private conservation easements bring substantial benefits as we seek to
preserve for future generations the ecological and natural values of land against the
pressures of development. At the same time, the perpetual nature, rigidity, and
nonpublic attributes of these interests present challenges for present and future
generations. The advantages of private conservation easements can be enhanced by
implementing the five principles suggested in this Article that will result in market
benefits, increased flexibility, and community participation.
